Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of Rights and Authority by McNeil, Kent
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
Volume 57 
Issue 1 Volume 57, Issue 1 (Summer 2020) 
Special Issue: A Right without a Rights-Holder Is 
Hollow 
Guest editor: Karen Drake 
Article 4 
1-14-2021 
Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the 
Holders of Rights and Authority 
Kent McNeil 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Article 
Citation Information 
McNeil, Kent. "Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of Rights and 
Authority." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 57.1 () : 127-172. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol57/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. 
Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of Rights 
and Authority 
Abstract 
Aboriginal rights, including governance authority, are collective. In order to determine who can exercise 
these rights, it is therefore essential to be able to identify the collective that holds them. This article 
examines and analyzes Canadian cases relating to this matter that involve First Nation holders or 
claimants of rights in three contexts: (1) Aboriginal title cases; (2) cases involving Aboriginal rights apart 
from title; and (3) duty to consult cases. The jurisprudence reveals that the issue of the identity of rights 
holders is treated by the courts as a matter of fact. It depends on evidence of the cultural traditions and 
laws of Indigenous peoples themselves, which has to be presented to the court by testimony of persons 
who are knowledgeable and have the authority to speak about these matters. Because this issue of the 
identity of rights holders depends on Indigenous cultures and laws, each situation presents unique 
features. 
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol57/iss1/4 
 
127 
Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous 
Governance: Identifying the Holders of 
Rights and Authority 
KENT MCNEIL* 
Aboriginal rights, including governance authority, are collective. In order to determine who 
can exercise these rights, it is therefore essential to be able to identify the collective that 
holds them. This article examines and analyzes Canadian cases relating to this matter 
that involve First Nation holders or claimants of rights in three contexts: (1) Aboriginal title 
cases; (2) cases involving Aboriginal rights apart from title; and (3) duty to consult cases. The 
jurisprudence reveals that the issue of the identity of rights holders is treated by the courts 
as a matter of fact. It depends on evidence of the cultural traditions and laws of Indigenous 
peoples themselves, which has to be presented to the court by testimony of persons who 
are knowledgeable and have the authority to speak about these matters. Because this issue 
of the identity of rights holders depends on Indigenous cultures and laws, each situation 
presents unique features. 
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SECTION 35(1) OF THE Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes and afrms the 
“aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.” Te Aboriginal 
peoples are defned in section 35(2) as including “the Indian, Inuit, and Métis 
peoples of Canada.”1 Tat is the extent to which the Canadian constitution 
identifes the potential holders of section 35 rights, leaving the matter to be 
resolved by judicial decisions or negotiated agreements. Tis article examines 
how Canadian courts have addressed the issue of identifying Aboriginal rights 
holders in specifc instances, mainly in parts of Canada that are not subject to 
historical or modern-day treaties relating to land. As the focus is on the law of the 
Canadian state as interpreted and applied by the courts, especially the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC), the analysis is doctrinal. Of course, Indigenous peoples 
have their own legal orders,2 and I am of the view that identifcation of Aboriginal 
rights holders should involve the application of Indigenous law, derived from 
Indigenous governance authority. Canadian courts can, and occasionally do, 
take account of Indigenous law in rendering decisions, but they inevitably do 
so within the framework of the Canadian legal system from which they derive 
1. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11 
ss 35(1), 35(2). 
2. See e.g. Ardith Walkem, “An Unfulflled Promise: Still Fighting to Make Space for 
Indigenous Legal Traditions” in Maria Morellato, ed, Aboriginal Law Since Delgamuukw
(Cartwright Group, 2009) 393; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University 
of Toronto Press, 2010); Val Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent” (2015) 48 UBC 
L Rev 873 [Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law”]; Val Napoleon, Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, 
Law, and Legal Teory (PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009) 
[unpublished]; Val Napoleon, Tinking About Indigenous Legal Orders (National Centre for 
First Nations Governance, June 2007); Hadley Friedland, Reclaiming the Language of Law: 
Te Contemporary Articulation and Application of Cree Legal Principles in Canada (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Alberta Faculty of Law, 2016) [unpublished]; Aaron James Mills 
(Waabishki Ma’iingan), Miinigowiziwin: All Tat Has Been Given for Living Well Together: 
One Vision of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism (PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria 
Faculty of Law, 2019) [unpublished]. See also Brent Olthuis, “Te Constitution’s Peoples: 
Approaching Community in the Context of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” 
(2009) 54 McGill LJ 1 (discussing the relevance of Indigenous norm generation to the issues 
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their authority, rather than within the context of Indigenous legal orders and 
governance authority. So when Indigenous people go to or end up in Canadian 
courts, either by choice or because they have been charged with an ofence or 
sued in a civil action, they fnd themselves subject to the Canadian law that is 
applied by the courts. It is therefore essential for them to know how a Canadian 
court might address the matters at issue, which can include determining the 
identity of Aboriginal rights claimants. 
In this article, I am going to discuss three categories of decisions: (1) Aboriginal 
title cases; (2) Aboriginal rights cases apart from title; and (3) duty to consult 
cases. My focus is mainly on SCC decisions involving First Nation Indigenous 
people arising in non-treaty areas. Te issue of the identity of Aboriginal title and 
rights holders can also arise in cases involving the Inuit and the Métis, but there 
is a scarcity of case law on the issue where the Inuit are concerned, and the unique 
circumstances of the Métis have been dealt with by others, including some of the 
contributors to this Special Issue.3 
I. ABORIGINAL TITLE CASES 
Five foundational Aboriginal title cases have reached the SCC:4 Calder v British 
Columbia (AG);5 Delgamuukw v British Columbia;6 R v Marshall; R v Bernard;7 
3. For a rare exception involving the Inuit, see Hamlet of Clyde River v TGS-NOPEC Geophysical 
Company ASA (TGS), 2015 FCA 179; Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 
2017 SCC 40 [Clyde River]. See Larry Chartrand, “Te Constitutional Determination 
of a Métis Rights-Bearing Community: Reorienting the Powley Test” in Karen Drake & 
Brenda L Gunn, eds, Renewing Relationships: Indigenous Peoples and Canada (Wiyasiwewin 
Mikiwahp Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2019) 169; Karen Drake, 
“Who are the Métis? Te Role of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in Identifying a Métis 
Rights-Holder” in Dwight Newman & Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, eds, Indigenous-Industry 
Agreements, Natural Resources, and the Law (Routledge) [forthcoming in 2020] (discussing 
the identifcation of Métis rights holders). 
4. See also St Catharines Milling & Lumber Co v R (1887), 13 SCR 577, af’d [1888] UKPC 
70. Although Aboriginal title was discussed, the case involved a dispute between the federal 
government and the Province of Ontario over entitlement to lands and resources after 
the Aboriginal title had been supposedly surrendered by Treaty 3 (1873). No Indigenous 
nations or persons were party to the action or even called as witnesses. See Kent McNeil, 
Flawed Precedent: Te St. Catherine’s Case and Aboriginal Title (UBC Press, 2019) [McNeil, 
Flawed Precedent]. 
5. [1973] SCR 313 [Calder SCC]. 
6. [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw SCC]. 
7. R v Marshall and R v Bernard were heard together in the Supreme Court, resulting in a single 
judgment (2005 SCC 43 [Marshall/Bernard SCC]). 










and Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia.8 While the matter of the appropriate 
title holders was not a live issue in Calder and Marshall/Bernard, these decisions are 
nonetheless relevant and important because they reveal underlying assumptions 
of the parties and the judges. 
Calder was a representative action, brought by Frank Calder and other 
members of the Nisga’a Nation (referred to as the Nishga Nation and the 
Nishga Indian Tribe in the case) on behalf of that nation, seeking a declaration 
“that the Aboriginal title, otherwise known as the Indian title, of the Plaintifs 
to their ancient tribal territory hereinbefore described, has never been lawfully 
extinguished.”9 Te trial judge found that the plaintifs, who were ofcers of the 
Nishga Tribal Council and councilors of the four Indian Act bands into which the 
8. 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC]. A recent case, Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney 
General) v Uashannuat (Innu of Uashat and of Mani-Utenam), 2020 SCC 4, involves an 
Aboriginal title claim, but the SCC’s decision involves a jurisdictional issue rather than the 
substantive claim. See also Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band v Canadian National Railway
(1989), 34 BCLR (2d) 344 (CA) [Oregon Jack], af’d [1989] 2 SCR 1069. In addition to 
the fve SCC  decisions, this decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) 
involved an application to amend a statement of claim, brought by thirty-six chiefs of 
Indian bands on behalf of themselves and all other members of their bands, alleging that 
double-tracking of a section of the Canadian National Railway along the Tompson River 
would negatively afect Aboriginal title and fshing rights in the Tompson and Fraser rivers. 
In allowing the amendment of the representative action to include all members of the three 
Indigenous nations whose ancestors had occupied lands along these rivers prior to European 
colonization, Justice MacFarlane, delivering the unanimous judgment, stated: 
In my opinion, the date at which it must be shown that there was an organized society 
occupying the specifc territory over which the plaintifs, as descendants of the members of 
that society, now assert aboriginal title is the date at which sovereignty was asserted by the 
Europeans. Te society need not have been what we now regard as a legal entity, and the 
descendants of that society need not, in order to have status to bring an action, prove that such 
a legal entity now exists. Whether the plaintifs can establish the necessary criteria and show 
that they are descendants of the members of a society who in common held such Aboriginal 
rights is a matter to be determined on evidence (ibid at paras 33-34). 
In a short judgment dismissing an application to rehear the appeal it had already rejected, 
the SCC observed that, in pronouncing “that the action was personal in nature rather than 
derivative and the plaintifs need not establish either the continued existence of the Indian 
nations nor authority to bring the action … , the Court of Appeal went beyond the narrow 
issue before them – whether the pleadings were clearly invalid,” but the court decided that 
those obiter pronouncements did not afect the outcome on that narrow issue and so did not 
provide grounds for a rehearing (the SCC declined to comment on the correctness of the 
pronouncements). See [1990] 1 SCR 117 at 118-19. As far as I am aware, this case never 
went to trial. See Olthuis, supra note 2 at 16-17 (for discussion of the BCCA decision). 
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Nisga’a Nation had been divided, were “appropriate and adequate representatives 
to bring the action on the part of the Nishga Indian Tribe.”10 Tey were 
described by Justice Judson of the SCC as “descendants of the Indians who have 
inhabited since time immemorial the territory in question.”11 No one, including 
the plaintifs who were members of the Nisga’a band councils, seems to have 
questioned that, if Aboriginal title existed, it was held by the Nisga’a Nation as a 
whole, not by the Indian bands or other subgroups within the nation. However, 
the consequences of the nation holding title were not addressed, as the Court 
refused the declaration because a majority of the judges decided that the action 
could not be brought against the Crown in right of British Columbia without a 
fat (basically, permission) of the Lieutenant Governor of the province.12 
Marshall/Bernard involved prosecutions under provincial statutes in Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick for harvesting and possessing logs on lands the 
provinces claimed as Crown lands. Te accused, who are members of the Mi’kmaw 
Nation in Nova Scotia and the Miramichi Mi’kmaq in New Brunswick, raised 
Aboriginal title, as well as treaty rights, as their defence. Tere seems to have 
been no question that they are Mi’kmaq who would be entitled to the benefts 
of Aboriginal title if they were able to establish that the Mi’kmaq had Aboriginal 
title to the sites where the cutting of timber took place. However, as the SCC 
agreed with the trial judges that the accused had not proven that the Mi’kmaq 
exclusively occupied the sites at the time of the British Crown’s assertion of 
sovereignty, their claim to Aboriginal title failed. Since they were also unable to 
convince the judges that they had treaty rights to harvest timber commercially, 
they were convicted. 
In his trial judgment in R v Bernard,13 Justice Lordon seems to have taken 
for granted that the Miramichi Mi’kmaq, rather than the three Mi’kmaw bands 
with reserves in the area of New Brunswick where title was asserted, would be 
the Aboriginal title holders if title had been proven, which he decided it had 
not. On appeal, Justice Daigle of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal decided 
10. Calder v British Columbia (AG) (1969), 8 DLR (3d) 59 at 61 (BCSC). 
11. Calder SCC, supra note 5 at 317. 
12. See ibid at 345, 426-27. In his dissent, concurred in by Justice Spence and Justice Laskin, 
Justice Hall would have simply issued a declaration that “the appellants’ right to possession 
… and their right to enjoy the fruits of the soil, of the forest, and of the rivers and streams 
within the boundaries of said lands have not been extinguished”: ibid at 422. See Hamar 
Foster, Heather Raven & Jeremy Webber, eds, Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder 
Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (UBC Press, 2007). 
13. [2000] 3 CNLR 184 (NB Prov Ct). 














that the Miramichi Mi’kmaq do have collective Aboriginal title to the Northwest 
Miramichi watershed,14 but this decision was overturned by the SCC. 
In R v Marshall,15 the accused asserted that the Mi’kmaq had Aboriginal 
title to all of Nova Scotia. Justice Curran at trial accepted that they had lived 
in individual communities that got together on occasions, concluding that, 
although “they did not have a fully-developed sense of being a nation, … [t]hey 
were still a collection of communities.”16 However, as he found that Aboriginal 
title had not been proven, the signifcance of this fnding for the identity of 
the putative title holders was not discussed. Te Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial because, among other reasons, it held that Justice Curran, and 
the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that upheld his decision,17 had applied 
the wrong test for assessing the occupation required to establish Aboriginal title.18 
Justice Cromwell (later of the SCC) reviewed the trial judge’s fndings of fact 
on the Mi’kmaw social and political organization, territoriality, and land tenure 
and use, and seems to have accepted that the divisions of their territory in Nova 
Scotia into seven districts and family hunting territories were developments that 
came after the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.19 As the trial judge had 
found that there was “no persuasive evidence that they divided the entire territory 
among their communities” prior to sovereignty,20 Justice Cromwell apparently 
thought that their Aboriginal title, if proven, would be held by the Mi’kmaw 
people of Nova Scotia as a whole. 
On appeal of the Marshall and Bernard cases to the SCC, Chief Justice 
McLachlin stated the central issue to be whether “the Mi’kmaq people in Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick … have treaty rights or aboriginal title entitling them” 
14. R v Bernard, 2003 NBCA 55 at para 190. 
15. 2001 NSPC 2 at para 3 [Marshall Prov Ct]. 
16. Ibid at para 55. 
17. 2002 NSSC 57. 
18. 2003 NSCA 105, especially at paras 249-53 [Marshall CA]. Justice Oland concurred with 
Justice Cromwell, and Justice Saunders also agreed with his reasons and disposition on 
the title issue. 
19. Ibid at paras 141-52. 
20. Marshall Prov Ct, supra note 15 at para 131 (quoted and emphasized by Justice Cromwell in 
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to “engage in commercial logging on Crown lands without authorization.”21 
Troughout her judgment, she referred to the “Mi’kmaq” and “Mi’kmaq people” 
as the Aboriginal title claimants, without separating them into individual 
communities or bands. Tis is consistent with how the constitutional questions 
were stated in each case, asking whether the provincial legislation under which 
the accused had been charged is “inconsistent with Mi’kmaq Aboriginal title.”22 
Te issue of the appropriate claimants in Aboriginal title cases was addressed 
more directly in Delgamuukw v British Columbia. Unlike Marshall/Bernard, where 
Aboriginal title was raised as a defence to prosecutions, Delgamuukw involved a 
direct claim by the Gitksan (now commonly spelled Gitxsan) and Wet’suwet’en 
peoples for a declaration of their Aboriginal title. It was a representative action, 
brought by “39 hereditary Gitksan and 12 Wet’suwet’en (total 51) chiefs for all 
or most of the Houses of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples, except … the 12 
Kitwancool chiefs.”23 Te position advanced by the plaintifs at trial, as expressed 
by Chief Justice McEachern, was “that their chiefs are themselves, as well as on 
behalf of Houses or members, entitled to a judgment declaring their ownership, 
under Canadian, Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en law, of the individual territories they 
claim. Tere is no specifc alternative claim pleaded by the plaintifs collectively 
for the territory or any part of it on a communal, people-wide basis.”24 As is well 
known, Chief Justice McEachern dismissed their claims, leading to appeals to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) and then to the SCC. 
Te SCC overturned Chief Justice McEachern’s judgment and ordered a 
new trial, partly because of his treatment of the oral histories, but also because 
the plaintifs had reframed the nature of the claim before the Court. Chief Justice 
21. Marshall/Bernard SCC, supra note 7 at para 1. Note that, in my respectful opinion, the way 
Chief Justice McLachlin framed this issue begged the question of whether lands subject to 
Aboriginal title really are Crown lands. See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme 
Court: What’s Happening?” (2006) 69 Sask L Rev 281 at 293-96. However, in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation SCC, supra note 8 at para 70, she returned to this issue and clarifed that the Crown’s 
underlying title to Aboriginal title lands does not have any benefcial content. See Kent 
McNeil, “Te Source, Nature, and Content of the Crown’s Underlying Title to Aboriginal 
Title Lands” (2018) 96 Can Bar Rev 273. 
22. Marshall/Bernard SCC, supra note 7 at paras 107-08. 
23. Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1991), 79 DLR (4th) 185 at 237 (BCSC) [Delgamuukw
BCSC]. For a list of the plaintifs, see the style of cause in Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 
6. Note that there are Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en band councils as well under the Indian 
Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. Te Gitksan-Wet’suwet’en Tribal Council was formed in 1978, but 
although it played a coordinating role in the court case, it was not a plaintif claiming title. 
See Delgamuukw BCSC, supra at 235. 
24. Delgamuukw BCSC, supra note 23 at 237. 







Lamer explained that, on appeal, “the individual claims by each house have been 
amalgamated into two communal claims, one advanced on behalf of each nation. 
However, there were no formal amendments to the pleadings to this efect.”25 
He found this to be problematic:26 
Given the absence of an amendment to the pleadings, I must reluctantly conclude 
that the respondents [British Columbia and Canada] sufered some prejudice. 
Te appellants [the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en] argue that the respondents did not 
experience prejudice since the collective and individual claims are related to the 
extent that the territory claimed by each nation is merely the sum of the individual 
claims of each house; the external boundaries of the collective claims therefore 
represent the outer boundaries of the outer territories. Although that argument 
carries considerable weight, it does not address the basic point that the collective 
claims were simply not in issue at trial. To frame the case in a diferent manner 
on appeal would retroactively deny the respondents the opportunity to know the 
appellants’ case. 
Although the defect in the pleadings, combined with the mistreatment of 
the oral histories, prevented the Court from deciding the case on its merits, 
Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless proceeded to provide guidelines to trial courts 
on a number of vital issues, including proof, content, infringement, and 
extinguishment of Aboriginal title. For the purposes of this article, the most 
relevant aspect of his judgment is his apparent acceptance throughout that, if the 
case had been properly pleaded, Aboriginal title would be held by Aboriginal 
nations rather than by smaller collectives within nations, such as the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Houses. In a particularly relevant passage, he stated:27 
A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally. 
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collective 
right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to 
that land are also made by that community. Tis is another feature of aboriginal title 
which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal property interests. 
Tis should not be interpreted to mean that the rights and interests of 
houses, clans, and other smaller groups are unimportant or lack legal validity. 
Instead, I understand it to mean that Aboriginal title is a territorial right vested in 
the whole nation that applies externally as against the Crown and other persons 
25. Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at para 73. British Columbia and Canada argued that they 
were prejudiced as a result (ibid). 
26. Ibid at para 76. 
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who are not members of that nation.28 It is what my colleague Brian Slattery 
has referred to as a generic right because, apart perhaps from its inherent limit 
that does not allow the land to be used in ways that substantially diminish its 
value for future generations,29 it does not vary from one Aboriginal nation to 
another.30 It provides common law—and, since 1982, constitutional—protection 
to Indigenous territories within Canada.31 Internally, houses, clans, families, 
individuals, and so on, continue to have rights under a nation’s Indigenous laws,32 
28. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specifc or 
Territorial?” (2012) 91 Can Bar Rev 745. 
29. See Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at paras 125-32; Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8 at 
paras 74, 88. Note that Chief Justice McLachlin in the latter case reformulated the inherent 
limit from a backward-looking limit determined by historical uses to a forward-looking 
approach emphasizing sustainability. See Brian Slattery, “Te Constitutional Dimensions of 
Aboriginal Title” (2015) 71 SCLR (2d) 45 at 58-63 [Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”]; 
Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces after Tsilhqot’in Nation” (2015) 71 
SCLR (2d) 67 at 68 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”]. Query whether this 
reformulation makes the inherent limit more uniform among Aboriginal title holders. 
30. Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 727 at 745 
[Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”]; Brian Slattery, “Te Metamorphosis of 
Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can Bar Rev 255 at 269-71 [Slattery, “Metamorphosis”]. Both 
were quoted with approval by Justice Vickers in his trial judgment. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v 
British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at paras 471-72 [Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC]. Tey were 
also cited with apparent approval by Justice Groberman in his judgment on appeal in the 
same case, (sub nom William v British Columbia). See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 
2012 BCCA 285 at para 149 [Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA]. 
31. See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right” in 
Owen Lippert, ed, Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Delgamuukw Decision (Te Fraser Institute, 2000) 55, reprinted in Kent McNeil, Emerging 
Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 2001) 292 [McNeil, Emerging Justice]; McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the 
Provinces,” supra note 29. 
32. See Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26 at paras 33, 35 [Behn] (quoted in 
discussion below). 
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which are subject to the territorial authority of the nation and so should be 
alterable through the exercise of its inherent right of self-government.33 
Te more recent case of Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia is the strongest 
precedent so far on the identity of Aboriginal title holders, given that this was 
a contentious issue that was dealt with in some depth both at trial and at the 
BCCA. Like Delgamuukw, this was a representative action for a declaration of 
Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights, brought by Chief Roger William 
“on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of the Xeni Gwet’in 
First Nations Government and on behalf of all other members of the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation.”34 Te Xeni Gwet’in is one of the six First Nations (Indian Act bands) 
that make up the Tsilhqot’in Nation. Te plaintif and Canada (a defendant in 
the case, but supporting the plaintif’s position on this issue) contended that the 
community of Tsilhqot’in people is the holder of the title and other Aboriginal 
rights, whereas British Columbia argued at trial, and again in the BCCA, that 
the title and rights holder is the Xeni Gwet’in people.35 Te trial judge, Justice 
33. See Slattery, “Metamorphosis,” supra note 30 at 270; Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions,” 
supra note 29 at 52-54; Jeremy Webber, “Te Public-Law Dimension of Indigenous Property 
Rights” in Nigel Bankes & Timo Koivurova, eds, Te Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: 
National and International Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Hart, 2013) 79; Kent 
McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 821 
at 870-71 [McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”]; McNeil, Flawed Precedent, supra note 4 at 
166-67, 177-78, 188. For an acknowledgement of Indigenous nations’ inherent right of 
self-government over their Aboriginal title lands by Justice Williamson, see Campbell v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [2000] 4 CNLR 1 (BCSC) [Campbell v BC]. See discussion in 
Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal 
Coherence” in Foster, Raven & Webber, supra note 12, 129 at 139-43. But see House of 
Sga’nisim v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 1394, where Justice Smith followed 
Campbell v BC out of comity, but also held that the governance provisions of the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement (ratifed 2000), the validity of which was challenged in these cases, could be 
upheld as delegated governmental authority. Justice Smith’s decision was afrmed on appeal 
on the latter basis, without deciding the inherent right issue. See 2013 BCCA 49, leave to 
appeal to SCC refused, 35301 (22 August 2013). For commentary, see Joshua Nichols, “A 
Reconciliation without Recollection? Chief Mountain and the Sources of Sovereignty” (2015) 
48 UBC L Rev 515. 
34. See style of cause in Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30. For a representative Aboriginal 
title action in which the Crown, prior to trial, raised the issue of the membership of the 
claimant nation, see Cowichan Tribes v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 420. 
35. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 437. One reason why British Columbia 
contended that title is held by the band rather than the nation as a whole was practical: 
To fulfl its duty to consult, the province argued that it needs to be able to engage with a 
defnable legal entity, and the evidence revealed that the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole lacked 
a national political structure. See Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at paras 138-43. 
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Vickers, reviewed the limited SCC jurisprudence on this issue (especially 
Calder, Delgamuukw, Marshall/Bernard, and the Métis Aboriginal rights case, 
R v Powley36), and observed:37 
No matter how a contemporary community defnes membership, a critical inquiry 
for the purposes of s. 35(1) rights is an ancestral connection to the relevant 
community extant at contact in the case of rights, or at sovereignty, in the case of 
title. In all of the Aboriginal rights and title decisions I have reviewed, the relevant 
historic community has been the larger First Nation that existed at the time of 
contact or sovereignty. 
Tis raises the issue of continuity between the Aboriginal nation in whom 
title vested at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty38 and the present 
title-holding collective. In Marshall/Bernard, Chief Justice McLachlin put it this 
way: “Te requirement of continuity in its most basic sense simply means that 
claimants must establish they are right holders. Modern-day claimants must 
establish a connection with the pre-sovereignty group upon whose practices 
they rely to assert title or claim to a more restricted aboriginal right.”39 However, 
although there must be an ancestral connection by descent or succession between 
the Aboriginal people who were in exclusive occupation at the time of Crown 
36. 2003 SCC 43 [Powley]. 
37. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 445. 
38. See Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at para 145. Chief Justice Lamer stated that “aboriginal 
title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted.” For discussion in light of Tsilhqot’in 
Nation SCC, supra note 8, see McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces,” supra
note 29 at 71-78. 
39. Marshall/Bernard, supra note 7 at para 67. See also the quotation from Oregon Jack in supra
note 8. Note that this is not the only way in which the concept of continuity applies in 
the context of Aboriginal rights. As Chief Justice McLachlin went on to say in Marshall/ 
Bernard, it can also mean that there must be a sufcient similarity or connection between 
the historical practice on which an Aboriginal right is based and the exercise of the right 
in the present (ibid). See also R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 60-65 [Van der 
Peet]; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56 at paras 48-59 
[Lax Kw’alaams]. When present occupation of land is relied upon to raise an inference of 
occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty for the purpose of establishing 
Aboriginal title, there must also be continuity between the present-day and historical 
occupation. See Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at paras 152-54; Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, 
supra note 8 at paras 45-46. For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Continuity 
of Aboriginal Rights” in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions, Strategies, 
Directions (Purich, 2004) 127. 









sovereignty and the current claimants,40 this does not mean that they need be 
socially or politically organized in the same way.41 
Returning to Justice Vickers’ judgment, on this issue he concluded:42 
[T]he proper rights holder, whether for Aboriginal title or Aboriginal rights, is the 
community of Tsilhqot’in people. Tsilhqot’in people were the historic community 
of people sharing language, customs, traditions, historical experience, territory and 
resources at the time of frst contact and at sovereignty assertion. Te Aboriginal 
rights of individual Tsilhqot’in people or any other sub-group within the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation are derived from the collective actions, shared language, traditions and 
shared historical experiences of the members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation. 
Regarding British Columbia’s argument that Tsilhqot’in bands are the proper 
holders of Aboriginal rights and title today, Justice Vickers observed:43 
Te setting aside of reserves and the establishment of bands was a convenience to 
government at both levels. Te creation of bands did not alter the true identity of 
the people. Teir true identity lies in their Tsilhqot’in lineage, their shared language, 
customs, traditions and historical experiences. While band level organization may 
have meaning to a Canadian federal bureaucracy, it is without any meaning in the 
resolution of Aboriginal title and rights for Tsilhqot’in people. 
Although the Xeni Gwet’in people are regarded by the Tsilhqot’in as the 
caretakers of the lands in the Claim Area (which consists of only about fve per 
cent of the Tsilhqot’in’s claimed traditional territory),44 Justice Vickers observed 
that “the caretakers have no more rights to the land or the resources than any 
40. See also Justice La Forest’s concurring judgment in Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at 
para 198. He suggested that: 
the presence of two or more aboriginal groups in a territory may also have an impact on 
continuity of use. For instance, one aboriginal group may have ceded its possession to 
subsequent occupants or merged its territory with that of another aboriginal society. As well, 
the occupancy of one aboriginal society may be connected to the occupancy of another society 
by conquest or exchange. In these circumstances, continuity of use and occupation, extending 
back to the relevant time, may very well be established (ibid). 
41. See Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 457. Justice Vickers noted that: 
[t]he political structures may change from time to time. Self identifcation may shift from 
band identifcation to cultural identifcation depending on the circumstances. What remains 
constant are the common threads of language, customs, traditions and a shared history that 
form the central ‘self ’ of a Tsilhqot’in person. Te Tsilhqot’in Nation is the community with 
whom Tsilhqot’in people are connected by those four threads (ibid). 
42. Ibid at para 470. 
43. Ibid at para 469. 
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other Tsilhqot’in person.”45 So the subgroup responsible for the land is not 
necessarily the holder of title thereto and other Aboriginal rights. 
In the Court of Appeal, Justice Vickers’ decision on this issue was challenged 
by British Columbia. Te province argued that the Xeni Gwet’in band is the 
proper title and rights holder because the “historical and ethnographic evidence 
… established that decision-making typically took place at the encampment or 
band level, and that while there were local chiefs, the Tsilhqot’in did not have 
a national chief or political organization.”46 Given these facts, the province 
contended that “the absence of any traditional pan-Tsilhqot’in governance 
structure is fatal to any claim on behalf of the Tsilhqot’in Nation.”47 Justice 
Groberman, writing the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal, responded 
to this argument as follows:48 
If the law adopted such a position, it might well be devastating to claims by groups 
such as the Tsilhqot’in. Te judge found that Tsilhqot’in decision-making and 
governance traditionally took place on a localized level, typically within family or 
encampment groupings, depending on the season. Because of the fuidity of the 
group structure and the limits of available evidence, however, it would be impossible 
to trace those localized collectives into modern counterparts. If Aboriginal rights 
devolve only upon collectives that can show that they are the modern successors of 
groups that had a clear decision-making structure, no one would be able to claim 
Aboriginal rights on behalf of the Tsilhqot’in. 
Although Justice Vickers had concluded that the Tsilhqot’in did not have a 
national political structure, either historically or at the time of the trial,49 Justice 
Groberman did not regard this as an impediment to fnding that Aboriginal title 
and rights are held by the Tsilhqot’in people as a whole. While acknowledging 
the practical difculties faced by the province in fulflling its duty to consult 
if Aboriginal title and rights are held by a nation that lacks a national political 
structure with decision-making authority, he agreed with Justice Vickers that 
45. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 468 (see also ibid at para 459). 
46. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at para 53. 
47. Ibid at para 145. Interestingly, by making this argument British Columbia implicitly 
acknowledged that there is an intimate connection between Aboriginal title and governance. 
On this, see the sources in supra note 33 and further discussion below. 
48. Ibid at para 146. 
49. See Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 456; Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra
note 30 at paras 55, 140. According to Justice Vickers, the Tsilhqot’in National Government 
(TNG), which had been established in 1989, did not represent all the Tsilhqot’in 
people. Nonetheless, the federal government has consulted with the TNG regarding 
resource development in the Tsilhqot’in territory. See e.g. Taseko Mines Limited v Canada 
(Environment), 2017 FC 1100. 









“the evidence clearly established that the holders of Aboriginal rights within 
the Claim Area have traditionally defned themselves as being the collective of 
all Tsilhqot’in people. Te Tsilhqot’in Nation, therefore, is the proper rights 
holder.”50 Commenting further on British Columbia’s arguments on this issue, 
Justice Groberman observed:51 
In my view, the position taken by British Columbia does not take adequate account 
of the Aboriginal perspective with respect to this matter. I agree with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the defnition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be 
determined primarily from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself. 
Regarding the practical problem facing governments that have a legal 
obligation to consult with Indigenous peoples who have claimed or established 
Aboriginal title and rights, Justice Groberman found that, “[f ]ortunately, the 
record in this case resolves the question of who speaks for the Tsilhqot’in Nation” 
in relation to particular lands within their traditional territory, specifcally the 
Claim Area.52 As the evidence showed that the Xeni Gwet’in are the custodians 
or caretakers of that area, they have “a special role to play in asserting those rights 
and in engaging with governments in attempts to reconcile them with broader 
public interests.”53 
Te decision of the Court of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in Nation was appealed to the 
SCC, which overturned Justice Groberman’s ruling that Aboriginal title had not 
been proven and, for the frst time in Canada, issued a declaration of Aboriginal 
title.54 At the Supreme Court, British Columbia apparently abandoned its 
50. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at para 150. 
51. Ibid at para 149. For relevant interviews with Chief Commissioners Miles G Richardson, 
Steven Point, and Sophie Pierre, see also Canada, British Columbia Treaty Commission, 
Annual Report 2014, (BC Treaty Commission) at 5-15, online: <bctreaty.ca/sites/default/fles/ 
BCTC-Annual-Report-2014.pdf>. 
52. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at para 152. 
53. Ibid at para 156. 
54. Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8. For a collection of articles discussing the decision see 
Special Issue, Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 693-970. See 
also Andrée Boisselle, “To Dignity Trough the Back Door: Tsilhqot’in and the Aboriginal 
Title Test” (2015) 71 SCLR (2d) 27; Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions,” supra note 29; 
McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces,” supra note 29; John Borrows, “Aboriginal 
Title and Private Property” (2015) 71 SCLR (2d) 91; Robert Hamilton, “After Tsilhqot’in 
Nation: Te Aboriginal Title Question in Canada’s Maritime Provinces” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 
58; Felix Hoehn, “Back to the Future: Reconciliation and Indigenous Sovereignty after 
Tsilhqot’in” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 109; Bruce McIvor & Kate Gunn, “Stepping into Canada’s 
Shoes: Tsilhqot’in, Grassy Narrows and the Division of Powers” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 146; Larry 
Chartrand, “Indigenous Peoples: Caught in a Perpetual Human Rights Prison” (2016) 67 















MCNEIL, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE 141 
contention—or at least did not argue the point—that Aboriginal title and other 
rights are held by Indian Act bands rather than nations.55 Te decisions of Justice 
Vickers and Justice Groberman on this issue can therefore be taken as afrmed 
by the SCC’s declaration of title in favour of the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole.56 
Te SCC’s declaration of the Tsilhqot’in’s title raises an interesting legal 
personality issue.57 Te Court held in Delgamuukw,58 and afrmed in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation,59 that Aboriginal title is a proprietary right. In the common law, only 
natural persons (living human beings) and artifcial persons (corporations) 
have the legal personality necessary to hold property rights.60 For this reason, 
unless provided with this capacity expressly or implicitly by statute, collections 
of individuals, such as clubs and other unincorporated associations, generally 
cannot own property in their own right; instead, title is vested in all the members 
67 UNBLJ 235; Matthew VW Moulton, “Framing Aboriginal Title as the (Mis)Recognition 
of Indigenous Law” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 336. 
55. Tis issue was not raised in the Factum of the Province of British Columbia submitted to 
the Supreme Court. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 (Factum of the 
Respondents), online: SCC <scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/34986/FM020_ 
Respondents_Her-Majesty-the-Queen-et-al.pdf>. On the contrary, the province seems to 
have accepted Justice Groberman’s decision on this point, observing that, in his reasons, 
“[t]he Aboriginal perspective was at the forefront of the recognition of the Tsilhqot’in as the 
collective that is the proper holder of Aboriginal rights” (ibid at para 151). 
56. See Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8 at para 94. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that 
“[w]ith the declaration of title, the Tsilhqot’in have now established Aboriginal title.” See also 
Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCCA 193, 
leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2012] SCCA No 336 [Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish]. Te 
Court of Appeal decided that Indian Act bands are not necessarily the proper entities to be 
certifed in a class action alleging infringement of Aboriginal fshing rights by fsh farming in 
the Broughton Archipelago (ibid at para 77). In a concurring judgment, Justice Smith stated, 
[w]hile Aboriginal fshing rights adhere to the Aboriginal entity asserting them, they are 
not personal rights of the individual members of the Aboriginal entity; they do not exist 
independent of the entity. Rather they are collective rights that are for the use and beneft of all 
of the members of the Aboriginal entity asserting them (ibid at para 104). 
57. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Te Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of 
Aboriginal Title” [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”] in McNeil, Emerging Justice, supra note 
31, 102 at 122. 
58. Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at para 113. 
59. Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8 at paras 67-76. Te Court found that “[a]nalogies to 
other forms of property ownership – for example, fee simple – may help us to understand 
aspects of Aboriginal title” (ibid at para 72), and that “Aboriginal title confers ownership 
rights similar to those associated with fee simple” (ibid at para 73). 
60. Even the Crown is regarded as a corporation for this purpose. See FW Maitland, “Te Crown 
as Corporation” (1901) 17 Law Q Rev 131. 
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for the time being.61 It seems clear from the cases we have already examined 
that Aboriginal title is not vested in all the members of an Aboriginal nation 
as individuals; instead, it is a communal right vested in the whole nation as a 
single legal entity.62 In other words, apart from those Aboriginal nations that have 
been accorded the capacity to hold property rights by statute and land claims 
agreements,63 Aboriginal nations that have Aboriginal title must, at common law, 
have the legal personality necessary to hold property rights.64 Moreover, as these 
nations have communal decision-making authority over their lands, Aboriginal 
title is not just proprietary—it is also governmental in nature.65 As Brian Slattery 
has recently argued, this means that it is more akin to unencumbered provincial 
title to land than it is to private real property rights.66 
61. See generally Dennis Lloyd, Te Law Relating to Unincorporated Associations (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1938); Harold AJ Ford, Unincorporated Non-Proft Associations: Teir Property 
and Teir Liability (Clarendon Press, 1959); SJ Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into 
Corporate Teory (Australian National University Press, 1973). Note that another option 
is for the legal title to be held by a trustee for the beneft of the members, but in that 
situation the members still hold the equitable title as individuals, not as a collective with 
legal personality. 
62. See Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at para 115. 
63. See e.g. Nisga’a Final Agreement (ratifed 2000), online: <nnkn.ca/fles/u28/nis-eng.pdf>. 
“Te Nisga’a Nation, and each Nisga’a Village, is a separate and distinct legal entity, with the 
capacity, rights, powers, and privileges of a natural person, including to … acquire and hold 
property or an interest in property, and sell or otherwise dispose of that property or interest” 
(ibid at ch 11, s 5). 
64. Cf Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish, supra note 56. Justice Garson stated: 
Because the term “aboriginal collective” is not defned in the order or in the reasons for 
judgment, the question is whether such a group is a juridical person. As addressed above, 
the respondent argues that because the Aboriginal collectives hold constitutional rights, they 
ought to be able to sue through this class action. I decline to decide in a general way if any 
Aboriginal collective, for example a First Nation that may be organized and governed along 
traditional lines, could or could not be a juridical person. Tat question can be left for another 
day (ibid at para 79). 
However, in this case the “aboriginal collective” having or asserting Aboriginal fshing rights 
was not sufciently identifed and defned, and that is why the Court of Appeal decided it 
did not comprise a sufciently precise class for the purposes of certifcation (ibid). 
65. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See also Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Land Rights 
and Self-Government: Inseparable Entitlements” in Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse, eds, Between 
Indigenous and Settler Governance (Routledge, 2013) 135; Boisselle, supra note 54; Gordon 
Christie, “Who Makes Decisions over Aboriginal Title Lands?” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 743. 
66. Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions,” supra note 29. See also McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw,”
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In summary, I think it is clear from the cases we have discussed that Aboriginal 
title is held by Aboriginal nations or polities that are the descendants or successors 
of the Aboriginal peoples that were in exclusive occupation of their traditional 
territories at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty.67 Tis is consistent 
with the jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights apart from title that we will now 
examine. In examining these cases, it is nonetheless important to keep in mind 
a fundamental distinction between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights. 
Aboriginal title is exclusive, so except in situations where two or more Aboriginal 
nations share joint title,68 only one nation can have title to any particular 
land.69 As exclusivity does not appear to be a requirement for establishing other 
Aboriginal rights, proof that one Aboriginal nation or polity has an Aboriginal 
right—to hunt or fsh in a particular place, for example—should not bar other 
Aboriginal groups from establishing that they have such a right as well.70 
67. Te same basic conclusion was reached by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
regarding entitlement to the right of self-determination. See Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 (Supply and Services Canada, 
1996) at 177-80. Compare West Moberly First Nations v McLeod Lake Indian Band, 2014 
BCCA 283. Here, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia upheld an order granting 
intervener status to two Indian Act bands (the Takla Lake First Nation and Tsay Keh Dene 
First Nation) and the Tahltan Central Council, “a non-proft society representing the 
interests of the people of Tahltan ancestry” (ibid at para 4), because their claims to Aboriginal 
title and other rights in British Columbia gave them an interest in this litigation to determine 
the western boundary of Treaty 8. However, as the decision dealt only with their entitlement 
to intervener status, I do not interpret it as an acknowledgement that they are the proper 
holders of title or other rights. Although this case was decided just two weeks after the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8, the SCC decision was not mentioned. 
68. See McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title,” supra note 33, where American law on Aboriginal 
title is also discussed (ibid at 838-52). See especially the analysis of the following cases 
involving the identity of the title-holding group (ibid at 843-46): Confederated Tribes of the 
Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v United States, 177 Ct Cl 184 (1966); Iowa Tribe of the 
Iowa Reservation v United States, 195 Ct Cl 365 (1971); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa 
Indians v United States, 490 F (2d) 935 (Ct Cl 1974). 
69. See Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para 155. 
70. Ibid at para 159. Tis does not mean that Aboriginal resource use rights short of title can 
never be exclusive. If the evidence showed, for example, that one Aboriginal nation fshed 
in a certain lake and excluded all other Aboriginal people from doing so, they could have 
an exclusive fshing right there, though I would think that exclusion of others should be 
evidence of sufcient control to establish Aboriginal title. See McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal 
Title,” supra note 33 at 825-34. 








II. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS CASES71 
In many of the cases involving Aboriginal rights apart from title, at least those 
that have reached the SCC, the identity of the rights-holding entity does not 
appear to have been an issue. Most of these cases are prosecutions of First Nation 
individuals, in which it is sufcient for the accused, in order to claim the beneft 
of an Aboriginal right, to be a member of an Indian Act band or First Nation that 
has a connection to an Aboriginal people whose practices, customs, or traditions 
gave rise to the right at the time of contact with Europeans.72 Since the issue 
for the courts in these cases is deciding whether the accused is entitled to the 
beneft of the claimed Aboriginal right, it is generally not necessary for the judges 
to specify precisely the collective entity that holds the right today.73 Moreover, 
to the extent that judges have revealed their thinking on this matter, they have 
usually done so implicitly rather than explicitly. For these reasons, these cases 
generally shed less light on the identity of the present-day rights holders than do 
the Aboriginal title cases we have already examined. 
In addition, the pre-contact social and political organization of the Aboriginal 
people in question usually does not seem to be a factor in the judges’ view of the 
71. In this Part, I look primarily at cases that reached the Supreme Court of Canada that I think 
are most relevant to the issue of the title-holding collective. A more thorough discussion 
would examine more closely the numerous Aboriginal rights cases that did not reach the 
highest court, as well as Métis Aboriginal rights cases. See e.g. Powley, supra note 36. For 
discussion of this case, see Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at paras 441-44; Olthuis,
supra note 2 at 5, 21-25. Cf Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at para 157. See 
note 148 below. 
72. See e.g. R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow]; Van der Peet, supra note 39; R v NTC 
Smokehouse Ltd, [1996] 2 SCR 672; R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 [Adams]; R v Côté, [1996] 
3 SCR 139. See also R v Nikal, [1996] 1 SCR 1013 at para 95. Justice Cory, writing the 
majority judgment, observed that “the nature and scope of aboriginal rights will frequently 
be dependent upon membership in particular bands who have established particular rights 
in specifc localities.” However, while membership in a band is generally the way in which 
individuals establish entitlement to Aboriginal rights, bands are not necessarily the holders of 
Aboriginal rights. Nonetheless, a band could be if it is the successor to the Aboriginal people 
whose pre-contact culture gave rise to the right, as seems to be the case of the Heiltsuk Band 
whose Aboriginal right  to collect and sell herring spawn on kelp in commercial quantities 
was upheld in R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723. See also Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 1494 [Ahousaht Indian Band BCSC], discussed below. 
However, a First Nation individual seeking a declaration of a treaty or Aboriginal right as a 
plaintif lacks standing in the absence of the support of the rights-holding community. See 
Francis v Canada, 2018 FC 49 at para 25 [Francis FC], af’d 2018 FC 623, 2019 FCA 184 
[Francis FCA]. See also Canadian National Railway Co v Brant, [2009] 4 CNLR 47 (ONSC). 
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current rights-holding entity. In the leading case of R v Van der Peet, for example, 
the SCC apparently accepted that the Sto:lo people as a whole would today 
have the claimed Aboriginal right to exchange fsh for money or other goods (if 
proven, which the Court decided it had not been), even though the Sto:lo had 
been “at a band level of social organization rather than at a tribal level” at the time 
of contact,74 and are now organized at the community level into eleven Indian Act
bands or First Nations.75 
Te lack of any real analysis of the issue of the precise identity of the current 
rights-holding entity is particularly evident in cases where the right was not 
established by the evidence. R v Pamajewon,76 for example, involved appeals from 
convictions for unlawful gambling of members of two Ojibwa (Anishinaabe) 
Indian Act bands in Ontario, the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations. Te 
accused argued that these First Nations have an inherent right of self-government 
that includes the authority to conduct and regulate gambling activities on their 
reserve lands. Te SCC applied the test for Aboriginal rights laid down by the 
Court just the day before in Van der Peet,77 and upheld the convictions on the 
ground that the evidence led by the accused failed to prove that high-stakes 
gambling and the regulation thereof had been integral to the distinctive culture of 
the Ojibwa at the time of contact with Europeans. Chief Justice Lamer observed 
that the accused relied “in support of their claim on the fact that the ‘Ojibwa 
people … had a long tradition of public games and sporting events, which 
pre-dated the arrival of Europeans’,”78 but he decided that the limited evidence 
of this did not establish that it included high-stakes gambling. He concluded 
that the “evidence presented at both the Pamajewon and Gardner trials does not 
demonstrate that gambling, or that the regulation of gambling, was an integral 
part of the distinctive cultures of the Shawanaga or Eagle Lake First Nations.”79 
But as those First Nations are actually bands that owe their legal existence to 
the Indian Act, it is questionable whether they could ever meet the Van der Peet 
test by proving that they had distinctive cultures at the time of contact with 
Europeans, which, by virtue of the fur trade, probably occurred for the Ojibwa 
from whom they are descended long before the Dominion of Canada was even 
created. Surely Chief Justice Lamer meant that the Ojibwa people would have 
74. Van der Peet, supra note 39 at paras 90-91. 
75. See the Sto:lo Nation website: <stolonation.bc.ca/bands>. 
76. [1996] 2 SCR 821 [Pamajewon]. 
77. Supra note 39. 
78. Pamajewon, supra note 76 at para 26. 
79. Ibid at para 28. 










had to have a distinctive culture pre-contact that included the practice, custom, 
or tradition of high-stakes gambling. Whether the claimed Aboriginal right, had 
it been proven in that way, would now be held by the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake 
First Nations, or by some other present-day Ojibwa polity or polities, does not 
appear to have been seriously considered by the Court,80 no doubt because it was 
not necessary to identity the holders of unestablished rights. 
Mitchell v MNR81 involved a claim by an individual member of a First 
Nation to the beneft of an Aboriginal right, namely, to bring goods for trade 
from the United States into Canada without paying customs duties. Chief 
Justice McLachlin described Grand Chief Mitchell as “a Mohawk of Akwesasne, 
a Mohawk community located just west of Montreal, and a descendant of the 
Mohawk nation, one of the polities comprising the Iroquois Confederacy prior 
to the arrival of Europeans.”82 Te SCC decided that the alleged right had not 
been proven, as the evidence of “pre-contact Mohawk trading north of the 
Canada-United States boundary” was “sparse and tenuous,” and trading to the 
north that did take place was “clearly incidental, and not integral, to the Mohawk 
culture.”83 In assessing the evidence of trade, the Court’s focus was clearly on the 
Mohawk Nation as a whole, not just on the Akwesasne community that is only 
one of the Mohawk First Nations in Canada today.84 
R v Sappier; R v Gray85 involved prosecutions under provincial legislation 
for unlawfully harvesting wood on Crown lands in New Brunswick. Te accused 
in Sappier are Maliseets and members of the Woodstock First Nation, whereas 
the accused in Gray is Mi’kmaw and a member of the Pabineau First Nation. 
80. See ibid at para 24. Chief Justice Lamer “assum[ed] without deciding that s. 35(1) includes 
self-government claims,” but did not address the issue of how to identify the present-day 
holders of the right. 
81. 2001 SCC 33. 
82. Ibid at para 2. 
83. Ibid at para 3. 
84. Compare the order of the Federal Court of Appeal (overturned by the SCC), Mitchell v 
MNR, [1999] 1 FC 375 at para 56. Justice Sexton stated: 
the plaintif as a Mohawk of Akwesasne resident in Canada has an existing aboriginal right 
which is constitutionally protected by sections 35 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, when 
crossing the international border from New York to Ontario or Quebec, to bring with him 
to Canada, for personal use or consumption, or for collective use or consumption by the 
members of the community of Akwesasne, or for non-commercial scale trade with First Nation 
communities in Ontario or Quebec, goods bought in the State of New York without having to 
pay any duty or taxes to the government of Canada [emphasis added]. 
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In each case, the SCC decided that the accused had established that, as members 
of their respective First Nations, they had an Aboriginal right to harvest timber 
for domestic purposes because this practice had been integral to the Maliseet and 
Mi’kmaw cultures prior to contact with Europeans. Although the Court found 
that this right to harvest timber is site-specifc, Justice Bastarache, in his majority 
judgment, observed:86 
At the trial of Messrs. Sappier and Polchies, the Crown conceded that “the issue 
of territoriality does not arise in the trial of the Defendants on the charge set out 
herein” (Agreed Statement of Facts at para. 12, reproduced in the trial decision at 
p. 296). Moreover, in its reply to the defendants’ Notice of Contention, the Crown 
addressed the question of whether the harvesting of trees occurred within Crown 
lands traditionally used for this practice. Te Crown responded: “Tis question 
would not appear to be an issue as wood was gathered at will within the traditional 
Maliseet territory” (reproduced in the reasons of the Court of Appeal at para. 71). 
Territoriality is therefore not at issue in the Sappier and Polchies prosecution. 
Regarding the Gray case, Justice Bastarache noted that:87 
[T]he trial judge accepted Mr. Sewell’s evidence that the Mi’kmaq had traditionally 
used the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting. Te Court of 
Appeal noted that the Crown did not dispute this fnding (para. 15). 
Yet after deciding that the Aboriginal right had been made out in each case, 
Justice Bastarache concluded: 88 
Te respondent Mr. Gray possesses an aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic 
uses on Crown lands traditionally used for that purpose by members of the Pabineau 
First Nation. Te respondents Messrs. Sappier and Polchies possess an aboriginal 
right to harvest wood for domestic uses. Tat right is also site-specifc, such that its 
exercise is necessarily limited to Crown lands traditionally harvested by members of 
the Woodstock First Nation. 
With all due respect, I fnd this conclusion difcult to reconcile with the 
Crown’s admission in Sappier that “wood was gathered at will within the traditional 
Maliseet territory” and the Court’s consequent conclusion that “[t]erritoriality 
is therefore not at issue in the Sappier and Polchies prosecution.”89 Nor is it 
consistent with the undisputed “evidence that the Mi’kmaq had traditionally 
86. Ibid at para 52. Note that the meaning of the term “territoriality” in this context is unclear, 
as it is not defned in the Agreed Statement of Facts, reproduced at trial (in R v Sappier, 
[2003] 2 CNLR 294 (NB Prov Ct) at para 2), or in the judgments. 
87. Sappier/Gray, supra note 85 at para 53. 
88. Ibid at para 72. 
89. See quotation at supra note 86. 
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used the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting.”90 Tere 
does not appear to have been any evidence (at least not evidence referred to by 
the SCC) that a Mi’kmaw subgroup connected to the present-day Pabineau First 
Nation or a Maliseet subgroup connected to the current Woodstock First Nation 
even existed at the time of contact, let alone restricted their wood harvesting 
to defned portions of the Mi’kmaw and Maliseet territories.91 Surely it would 
have been more consistent with the evidence referred to by the Supreme Court 
to conclude that Mr. Gray has an Aboriginal right to harvest wood wherever the 
Mi’kmaq harvested pre-contact, and Messrs Sappier and Polchies likewise where 
the Maliseet harvested.92 
Unlike the other Aboriginal rights cases we have considered, Lax Kw’alaams 
Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General)93 did not involve a prosecution. It was 
a representative action brought by “Chief Councillor Garry Reece on his own 
behalf and on behalf of the members of the Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band and 
others”94 for a declaration of their right to fsh commercially in designated waters 
along the coast of British Columbia. Delivering the unanimous decision of the 
SCC, Justice Binnie described the action as “the claim of the Lax Kw’alaams First 
Nation and other First Nations listed in the Appendix to these reasons (herein 
collectively referred to as ‘Lax Kw’alaams’), whose ancestral lands stretch along the 
northwest coast of British Columbia between the estuaries of the Nass and lower 
Skeena rivers, to the commercial harvesting and sale of ‘all species of fsh’ within 
90. See quotation at supra note 87. 
91. At trial, Provincial Court Justice Cain referred in general terms to “the distinctive culture 
of the ancestors of the Woodstock First Nation in pre-European times.” See R v Sappier, 
[2003] 2 CNLR 294 at para 12. Te trial decision in R v Gray does not appear to have been 
reported, but the trial judge’s fndings in relation to this issue were summarized by Justice 
Robertson in the Court of Appeal for New Brunswick: “Second, he held that the trees in 
question were harvested from lands traditionally occupied by Mr. Gray’s ancestors. Tird, the 
trial judge concluded that the expert evidence of Mr. Sewell established that the Mi’kmaq 
traditionally used wood and that they continue to do so.” See R v Gray, [2004] 4 CNLR 201 
(CA) at para 5. In his SCC judgment, Justice Bastarache described the main issue as “whether 
the practice of harvesting wood for domestic uses was integral to the distinctive culture of the 
Maliseet and Mi’kmaq, pre-contact.” See Sappier/Gray, supra note 85 at para 27. 
92. Te Court’s apparent concern to limit the geographical scope of the right would no doubt be 
met by the practical reality that members of these First Nations would be unlikely to travel 
far from their communities to harvest wood if the resource was available closer to home. Te 
Court’s confnement of the right to domestic uses would reinforce this practical limitation. 
93. Lax Kw’alaams, supra note 39. 
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their traditional waters.”95 Tose First Nations are apparently descended from 
the Coast Tsimshian people who inhabited that region when the Europeans frst 
arrived around 1793.96 Te evidence led to prove the Aboriginal right therefore 
related to the fshing practices, customs, and traditions of the Coast Tsimshian 
people as a whole prior to this European contact. Regarding the identity of the 
current rights holders, the statement of claim asked for “a declaration that the Lax 
Kw’alaams or, in the alternative, each of the Allied Tsimshian Tribes, have existing 
Aboriginal rights,” but the trial judge restated this as an application for declarations 
that “the plaintifs have an existing Aboriginal right.”97 Given the representative 
nature of the action, the term “plaintifs” may be vaguer than “Lax Kw’alaams or, 
in the alternative, each of the Allied Tsimshian Tribes,” but the precise identity of 
the current rights holders was never clarifed because the courts, all the way up 
to the SCC, decided that the right to a commercial fshery had not been proven. 
Justice Binnie agreed with the trial judge that the Coast Tsimshian’s pre-contact 
trade in eulachon grease did not provide a sufcient basis for “a modern right to 
fsh commercially all species” in that people’s traditional territory.98 
Although not a case decided by the SCC, Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada 
(Attorney General)99 deserves our attention because, like Lax Kw’alaams, 
it involved claims to commercial fsheries (as well as to Aboriginal title, which 
the court found unnecessary to address),100 and because the identity of the rights 
holders was a signifcant issue at trial. Te plaintifs are fve Indian Act bands, the 
Ehattesaht, Mowachaht/Muchalaht, Hesquiaht, Ahousaht, and Tla-o-qui-aht, 
on Vancouver Island. Tey claimed that,101 
before and at the time of contact with Europeans, their predecessors (collectively, 
the “Nuu-chah-nulth Nations”) existed as organized and self-governing social 
and political entities. Tey claim that the Nuu-chah-nulth Nations are culturally 
related groups that share common distinctive features including language, customs, 
practices, traditions, laws, economies, spiritual beliefs and culture. After British 
Columbia’s entry into Confederation in 1871, each of the Nuu-chah-nulth Nations 
95. Ibid at para 1. Te First Nations listed in the Appendix are the Ginaxangiik Tribe, Gitandoah 
Tribe, Gitwilgiots Tribe, Git’tsiis Tribe, Gitnadoiks Tribe, Gispaxloats Tribe, Gitlan Tribe, 
Gitzaxlaal Tribe, and Gitlutzau Tribe. 
96. Ibid at paras 15-16. Te SCC noted: “Te Lax Kw’alaams First Nation consists of the 
descendants of an ancient ‘fshing people’ comprising the several tribes or houses of the Coast 
Tsimshian” (ibid at para 15). 
97. Ibid at paras 25-26. 
98. Ibid at para 30. 
99. Ahousaht Indian Band BCSC, supra note 72. 
100. Ibid at paras 491-502. 
101. Ibid at para 7. 








was constituted as a band under the predecessor of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-
5, and, today, each band is the legal representative of its predecessor Nation and the 
lawful holder of the collective Aboriginal rights and title of that Nation. 
Justice Garson stated that, in order to succeed in their Aboriginal rights 
claims, the plaintifs had to102 
establish that they are the successor collectives to the Aboriginal groups that 
possessed Aboriginal rights at the date of contact. … Te question to be resolved is 
whether these modern plaintifs can prove that they are rights holders; that is, are 
they connected to the groups from whom they say they derive their Aboriginal rights 
to fsh and to trade in fsh. 
Justice Garson examined the relevant evidence at length in her judgment, and 
concluded that each of the fve bands had proven a sufcient connection with the 
pre-contact Nuu-chah-nulth Nation, from which they claimed to be descended, 
to be the present-day rights holders in that Nation’s traditional territory.103 She 
accordingly ordered, among other things, that104 
[t]he plaintifs have Aboriginal rights to fsh for any species of fsh in the environs 
of their territories and to sell fsh. Te approximate boundaries of each plaintif’s 
territory is [sic] delineated in Appendix A and further particularized for each 
plaintif at Exhibit 26, with the exception of the seaward boundary. Te seaward 
boundary is nine miles from a line drawn from headland to headland within each 
plaintif’s territory. 
Justice Garson’s decision was upheld by the BCCA, with one variation: 
geoduck clams were excluded from the plaintifs’ Aboriginal fshing rights because 
the Nuu-chah-nulth could not have engaged in this modern, high-tech fshery at 
the time of contact.105 
One other SCC decision deserves to be mentioned, even though it involved 
a claim to treaty rights rather than Aboriginal rights, because the Court made 
102. Ibid at para 287. See also the quotation from Marshall/Bernard SCC, supra note 7 at para 67, 
accompanying note 39 above. 
103. Ahousaht Indian Band BCSC, supra note 72 at paras 287-365. 
104. Ibid at para 909. 
105. Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 BCCA 237, af’d in part 2013 
BCCA 300. Te rehearing took place because, on appeal of the BCCA’s original judgment, 
the SCC ordered the case to be remanded to that court to be reconsidered in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lax Kw’alaams, supra note 39. Litigation subsequent to 
these decisions involves the issue of whether infringement of the Aboriginal right to fsh 
commercially can be justifed. See Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 













MCNEIL, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE 151 
some general statements about rights holders that are applicable to both 
categories of rights. Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd106 was a tort action brought 
by a forestry company against members of the Behn family, who belong to the 
Fort Nelson First Nation (FNFN) in British Columbia, for blockading a logging 
road providing access to an area where the company had been granted timber 
harvesting licences by the province. Te defendants argued that the licences were 
invalid because the province had not consulted with them prior to issuing the 
licences and because the licences infringed their treaty hunting and trapping 
rights. Te company responded by arguing that the Behns lacked standing to 
raise the issues of consultation and treaty rights as defences because the rights are 
held by the FNFN, not by individual members or families.107 Te Behns’ answer 
106. Behn, supra note 32. 
107. For other cases involving the issue of standing in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights, 
see Komoyue Heritage Society v British Columbia (AG), 2006 BCSC 1517 [Komoyue Heritage 
Society]; Papaschase Indian Band No 136 v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 ABCA 392 at 
paras 113-34, rev’d Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman, 2008 SCC 14 (on the application 
of statutory limitation periods without deciding the standing issue); Kelly v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2013 ONSC 1220 [Kelly]; Watson v Canada, 2017 FC 321 at paras 26-38; 
Red Chris Development Co v Quock, 2014 BCSC 2399 at paras 37-44; North Slave Métis 
Alliance v Canada (Indian Afairs and Northern Development), 2017 FC 932. See Kelly,
ibid at paras 56-57 (an action alleging that the government of Canada has not fulflled its 
obligations in Treaty 3 in relation to education). Justice Perell stated: 
Aboriginal rights are communal rights, but the rights holder; i.e., the aboriginal group that 
shares the right may be a family, a clan, a descent group, a hunting party, an encampment, 
a band, a tribe, a confederacy or a frst nation … . Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are 
collective rights, and the proper party with the standing to assert an aboriginal rights claim or 
a treaty rights claim is the collective that is the rights holder. 
In this representative action, Justice Perell opined that if the matter were justiciable (which he 
decided it was not), Grand Chief Warren White could replace Grand Chief Diane Kelly as a 
plaintif and would be 
able to bring a representative action on behalf of the benefciaries of Treaty 3 provided that: (1) 
he was authorized to do so by all of the 28 reserve bands (by band council resolutions); or (2) 
if he joins as party defendants those bands that do not authorize his representation action 
(ibid at para 121). 
Te Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed Justice Perell’s decision that the action was not 
justiciable and agreed that the representative action could go ahead if the conditions he 
imposed were met. See Kelly v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 92 at para 21. See 
also Kelly v Ontario (Minister of Energy), 2014 ONSC 5492, especially at para 19; Hwlitsum 
First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 BCCA 276 (leave to appeal to SCC refused, 
38325 (28 March 2019)) [Hwlitsum First Nation]. 










to this was summarized by Justice LeBel, who delivered the Court’s unanimous 
judgment, as follows: 108 
Tey recognize that these rights have traditionally been held by the FNFN, which 
is a party to Treaty No. 8. But they also allege that specifc tracts of land have 
traditionally been assigned to and associated with particular family groups. Tey 
assert in their pleadings that the Authorizations granted to Moulton are for logging 
in specifc areas within the territory traditionally assigned to the Behns, where they 
have exercised their rights to hunt and trap.
Te SCC decided that raising the consultation and treaty rights defences in 
this action was an abuse of process because the FNFN and the Behns had notice 
of the licences and should have challenged their validity in an action for judicial 
review before the company started work. Te Court therefore declined to rule on 
the treaty rights issue, but Justice LeBel did make some general comments about 
the holders of Aboriginal and treaty rights that are relevant to our discussion:109 
Aboriginal and treaty rights are collective in nature …. However, certain rights, 
despite being held by the Aboriginal community, are nonetheless exercised by 
individual members or assigned to them. Tese rights may therefore have both 
collective and individual aspects. Individual members of a community may have a 
vested interest in the protection of these rights. 
After declining to try to categorize Aboriginal and treaty rights any more 
precisely along collective and individual lines, Justice LeBel concluded:110 
on the occasion of this appeal and at this stage of the development of the law, … 
[i]t will sufce to acknowledge that, despite the critical importance of the collective 
aspect of Aboriginal and treaty rights, rights may sometimes be assigned to or 
108. Behn, supra note 32 at para 36. 
109. Ibid at para 33. As authority that Aboriginal and treaty rights are collective, Justice LeBel 
cited Sparrow, supra note 72 at 1112; Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para 115; R v Sundown, 
[1999] 1 SCR 393 at para 36; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at paras 17, 37; Sappier/Gray, 
supra note 85 at para 31; Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 SCR 
103 at para 35. 
110. Behn, supra note 32 at para 35. For a case in which an individual’s claim of a right to rely on 
Haudenosaunee law in relation to family matters was dismissed because the motion judge 
viewed the right as collective in nature, see Beaver v Hill, 2017 ONSC 7245 at paras 93-99. 
Te Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed this decision on the ground that it was premature 
to make a determination of the issue, given the incomplete record at this preliminary stage of 
the proceedings. See Beaver v Hill, 2018 ONCA 816 [Beaver ONCA]. For further litigation 
relating to this case, see Beaver v Hill, 2019 ONCA 520, leave to appeal to the SCC refused, 
38792 (16 January 2020). See also Francis FC, supra note 72 at paras 39-42. Here, the 
Federal Court dismissed a motion for advance costs brought by a First Nation man in a civil 
case, in part because he failed to show why he was entitled to claim a treaty or Aboriginal 
fshing right as an individual, as envisaged by Justice LeBel in Behn. Te Federal Court of 
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exercised by individual members of Aboriginal communities, and entitlements may 
sometimes be created in their favour. In a broad sense, it could be said that these 
rights might belong to them or that they have an individual aspect regardless of their 
collective nature. Nothing more need be said at this time. 
It is clear from the cases we have already examined that individuals can 
successfully rely on Aboriginal rights as a defence to prosecutions. One would 
therefore think that they should be able to rely on those rights in civil cases as 
well. Be that as it may, our concern in this article is the identity of the current 
holders of collective rights. In Behn, it seems to have been assumed that the 
FNFN, an Indian Act band, is the holder of those rights in the area where the 
logging was taking place.111 However, treaty rights are diferent from Aboriginal 
rights in this regard because the treaty records and documents provide direct 
evidence of the Aboriginal parties, whereas the identity of the Aboriginal 
peoples whose practices, customs, and traditions form the basis for Aboriginal 
rights depends more generally on historical, ethnographic, and other sources of 
evidence. As a result, and because the treaties are usually closer in time to the 
present, it is often easier to make a connection between parties who entered into 
the treaties and the present-day holders of collective treaty rights than it is to 
make a connection between Aboriginal peoples at the time of contact and the 
holders of Aboriginal rights today.112 
111. See Behn, supra note 32 at paras 5-6. See also Kiapilanoq v British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 
54, especially at para 25. In Fort Nelson First Nation v British Columbia, Justice Davies held 
that the province owes a duty to consult the Fort Nelson First Nation in relation to the 
development of a sand and gravel pit within their traditional territory. Tis decision was 
reversed on appeal, but not on the issue of the proper rights holder. See 2015 BCSC 1180, 
rev’d 2016 BCCA 500. 
112. Te SCC has refused to impose too high a standard for establishing such a connection in 
the case of treaty rights. See R v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 407. Chief Justice Dickson, 
delivering the unanimous judgment, responded to the Crown’s argument that the appellant 
had “not shown that he is a direct descendant of a member of the original Micmac Indian 
Band covered by the Treaty of 1752” (the treaty the appellant relied upon as a defence to the 
charge of unlawful hunting): 
In my view, the appellant has established a sufcient connection with the Indian band, 
signatories to the Treaty of 1752. As noted earlier, this Treaty was signed by Major Jean Baptiste 
Cope, Chief of the Shubenacadie Micmac tribe, and three other members and delegates of the 
tribe. Te Micmac signatories were described as inhabiting the eastern coast of Nova Scotia. 
Te appellant admitted at trial that he was a registered Indian under the Indian Act, and was an 
“adult member of the Shubenacadie-Indian Brook Band of Micmac Indians and was a member 
of the Shubenacadie Band Number 02.” Te appellant is, therefore, a Shubenacadie-Micmac 
Indian, living in the same area as the original Micmac Indian tribe, party to the Treaty of 1752. 
Tis evidence alone, in my view, is sufcient to prove the appellant’s connection to the tribe 
originally covered by the Treaty. 





Tis brief survey of some of the SCC decisions involving claims by First 
Nations to Aboriginal rights apart from title reveals that the Court’s approach has 
generally been to determine whether the individuals claiming the beneft of the 
right are members of a First Nation or Indian band today that has a connection 
with an Aboriginal people for whom the practice, custom, or tradition on which 
the alleged right is based was integral to their distinctive culture at the time 
of contact with Europeans. Te Court does not appear to be too concerned 
with precise defnition of the rights-holding entity, either at the time of contact 
or in the present day. As long as there is a sufcient connection between the 
relevant Aboriginal people at contact and the current Aboriginal community to 
which the individuals belong, that seems to meet the continuity requirement 
for the claimants of the Aboriginal right today. However, where the individuals 
are members of a subgroup within a larger entity such as an Aboriginal nation, 
it does not mean that the subgroup is the holder of the right.113 For example, 
if Dorothy Van der Peet had been able to establish an Aboriginal right to exchange 
fsh for money or other goods in Van der Peet, it seems that all members of the 
Sto:lo Nation, not just members of the Sto:lo band or First Nation to which she 
belongs, would have the beneft of that right today. Similarly, if Chief Mitchell 
had been able to prove the trading right in the Mitchell case, presumably all 
113. See text accompanying notes 85-92. Tough Sappier/Gray may appear inconsistent with this 
conclusion, I think there are problems with this aspect of the decision. Te Court’s concern 
seems to have been to limit the territorial scope of the wood-harvesting right, but in so doing 
I think the judges did not take sufcient account of the admissions and evidence regarding 
the identity of the Aboriginal peoples—the Maliseet and Mi’kmaw peoples— whose 
pre-contact activities gave rise to the harvesting right. See Sappier/Gray, supra note 85 at para 
53. With respect, I think Justice Bastarache’s leap in logic in this regard is evident in the 
following passage of his judgment: 
In the Gray trial, the trial judge accepted Mr. Sewell’s evidence that the Mi’kmaq had 
traditionally used the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting. Te Court 
of Appeal noted that the Crown did not dispute this fnding (para. 15). I would conclude on 
this basis that Mr. Gray has established an aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses 
on Crown lands traditionally used for this purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation 
(ibid at para 53). 
How, one might ask, does the factual fnding that “the Mi’kmaq had traditionally used 
the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting” get transformed into a 
conclusion relating to “Crown lands traditionally used for this purpose by members of the 
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Mohawk communities in Canada, not just the Mohawks of Akwesasne, would 
be the holders of the right.114 
So far, we have examined cases where a claim to Aboriginal title or some 
other Aboriginal right was asserted, and an attempt was made to prove that title 
or right in court. In other cases, title and other rights are claimed, not in order 
to get a court declaration of their existence or as a defence against prosecution, 
but rather to force governments to consult with the Indigenous people concerned 
before resource development or another activity, such as the building of dams 
or infrastructure, goes ahead in their territory. Tese cases raise the issue of 
determining whom governments need to consult with in specifc instances, which 
of course depends on the identity of the collectives claiming Aboriginal title or 
rights at the time when consultation must take place. We will now examine some 
of these cases. 
III. DUTY TO CONSULT CASES115 
In the leading case of Haida Nation v British Columbia,116 the SCC decided that 
the Crown (in this case the Crown in right of the province) has a constitutional 
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when it contemplates action that 
might have some adverse impact on their Aboriginal rights, even if those rights 
have only been claimed but not yet established in court or acknowledged by a 
historical treaty or modern land claims agreement. Te Court found that British 
Columbia had not consulted with the Haida people when it modifed a tree farm 
licence that permitted harvesting of timber on Haida Gwaii (formerly the Queen 
Charlotte Islands) and when it later transferred the licence to another forestry 
company. Tis decision, along with Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British 
114. See also Adams, supra note 72. In Adams, the accused, also an Akwesasne Mohawk, was 
found to have an Aboriginal right to fsh for food in Lake St. Francis in Quebec because 
fshing there was integral to the distinctive culture of the Mohawks prior to contact with 
Europeans. Nothing in Chief Justice Lamer’s decision suggests that only the Mohawks of 
Akwesasne have this right. He stated: 
Te appellant argues that the Mohawks have an aboriginal right to fsh in Lake St. Francis. 
In order to succeed in this argument the appellant must demonstrate that, pursuant to the test 
laid out by this Court in Van der Peet, fshing in Lake St. Francis was “an element of a practice, 
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture” of the Mohawks. For the reasons given 
below, I am of the view that the appellant has satisfed this test (ibid at para 34). 
115. Te discussion in this Part is limited to selective Aboriginal title and rights cases, and so does 
not consider cases involving treaty rights. 
116. 2004 SCC 73 [Haida Nation SCC]. 












Columbia,117 a companion case decided the same day, set the stage for a stream of 
duty to consult cases in British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada. No attempt 
will be made in this article to provide anything like a comprehensive survey of 
these numerous cases. Instead, our focus will be on a few selected decisions that 
cast some light on the identity of the rights holders or claimants with whom 
consultation must take place. For, as Justice LeBel stated in the Behn decision,118 
117. 2004 SCC 74 [Taku River]. 
118. Behn, supra note 32 at para 30, citing Komoyue Heritage Society, supra note 107. See also Behn 
at para 31 (“given the absence of an allegation of an authorization from the FNFN, in the 
circumstances of this case, the Behns cannot assert a breach of the duty to consult on their 
own, as that duty is owed to the Aboriginal community, the FNFN”). See also Beckman v 
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 35; John Voortman & Associates 
Ltd v Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chiefs Council, [2009] 3 CNLR 117 at para 73 (ONSC) 
[John Voortman]. In John Voortman, Justice Henderson decided that no duty to consult 
was owed to Haudenosaunee Men’s Fire of Grand River (HMF) in relation to a land claim 
because “the HMF is not well defned and its authority to represent aboriginal people is not 
well established.” See also Fond du Lac Denesuline First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 
2010 FC 948 at para 163), af’d 2012 FCA 73 (without addressing this issue). Justice 
Russell decided: 
Camsell Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston Lake [municipalities in 
northern Saskatchewan] may well have Aboriginal residents and connections to Aboriginal 
communities, but these entities themselves do not enjoy section 35 rights. Counsel for the 
Applicants has explained that these entities are being used in a convenient representative 
capacity for the Aboriginal members of their respective communities, but there is nothing 
before the Court to show how they acquired this representative capacity and whether they 
are truly authorized to make this application on behalf of the Aboriginal members of their 
communities. Consequently, in so far as this application depends upon section 35 rights 
and the duty of the Crown to consult with Aboriginal groups or persons, Camsell Portage, 
Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston Lake have not established that they have standing 
(ibid at para 163. 
See also Native Council of Nova Scotia v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 45 at paras 
42-44, af’d 2008 FCA 113 (without addressing this issue). Justice Layden-Stevenson was 
willing to assume that the Native Council of Nova Scotia (NCNS) could represent Mi’kmaq 
and other Aboriginal persons living of-reserve in Nova Scotia in consultations in relation to 
their alleged Aboriginal right to fsh. He stated: 
Because the of-reserve aboriginal population of Nova Scotia chose the NCNS to represent 
them in their dealings with DFO [Department of Fisheries and Oceans], the NCNS (as an 
organization) holds the procedural right of consultation while its individual members hold the 
substantive right to fsh (ibid at para 43). 
However, because there was a paucity of evidence of the alleged right for members of the 
NCNS other than Mi’kmaw members, the NCNS could not claim it was owed a duty to 
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[t]he duty to consult exists to protect the collective rights of Aboriginal peoples. For 
this reason, it is owed to the Aboriginal group that holds the s. 35 rights, which are 
collective in nature … . But an Aboriginal group can authorize an individual or an 
organization to represent it for the purpose of asserting its s. 35 rights. 
In the Haida Nation case itself, the style of cause described the plaintifs as 
the “Council of the Haida Nation and Guujaaw, on their own behalf and on 
behalf of all members of the Haida Nation.”119 Te portion of the declaration 
of the BCCA that was afrmed by the SCC declared that the Crown in right of 
the province has “a legally enforceable duty to the Haida people to consult with 
them in good faith and to endeavour to seek workable accommodations between 
the aboriginal interests of the Haida people, on the one hand, and the short term 
and long term objectives of the Crown.”120 In the SCC judgment, the duty is 
said to be owed to the “Haida people,” or just the “Haida,” as they are the people 
with a strong claim to Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights. Writing the 
unanimous judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin observed: “Te Haida have 
claimed title to all of Haida Gwaii for at least 100 years.”121Te website of the 
Haida Nation states:122 
Te Haida Nation collectively holds Hereditary and Aboriginal Title and Rights 
to Haida Territories and the cultural and intellectual property rights of the Haida 
Nation. All people of Haida ancestry are citizens of the Haida Nation. Every Haida 
citizen has the right of access to all Haida Gwaii resources for cultural reasons, and 
for food or commerce consistent with the Laws of Nature as refected in the laws of 
the Haida Nation. 
More recently, Justice Veale in Kaska Dena Council v Yukon, 2019 YKSC 13, held that the 
Kaska Dena Council did not have authority to bring an application for a declaration that the 
Yukon has a duty to consult with it before issuing hunting licences because the Council did 
not claim to have Aboriginal rights nor had it received authorization from the rights-bearing 
First Nations to bring such an action; on the contrary, one of those First Nations denied its 
authority to do so. See also Wesley v Canada, 2017 FC 725. 
119. Supra note 116. Guujaaw was the President of the Council of the Haida Nation 
at the time. See “Innovative Haida leader Guujaaw steps aside,” CBC News 
(11 December 2012), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/ 
innovative-haida-leader-guujaaw-steps-aside-1.1200975>. 
120. Haida Nation v British Columbia, 2002 BCCA 147 at para 60. 
121. Haida Nation SCC, supra note 116 at para 65. 
122. “History of the Haida Nation,” online: Council of the Haida Nation <www.haidanation. 
ca/?page_id=26>. Legal expression of this is in the Constitution of the Haida Nation. 
See Constitution of the Haida Nation, (2018), art 3, online (pdf ): <www.haidanation.ca/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Constitution-2018-10-signed.pdf >. 











In afrming that the duty to consult is owed to the Haida people, the SCC’s 
judgment is consistent with the Haida’s own assertion that the whole Haida 
Nation has a collective right to their lands and resources that can be accessed by 
every Haida citizen. Distribution of governmental authority within the Haida 
Nation therefore does not afect, and is not relevant to, the identity of the title 
and rights holder, which is the Haida people collectively rather than a governing 
body.123 However, according to Justice LeBel in the Behn decision, the Haida 
people can delegate authority to a governing body or individuals to represent 
them in consultations in relation to their Aboriginal title and other rights. 
In my opinion, such a delegation would be an exercise of the Haida Nation’s 
governance authority over their title and other rights.124 
In the Taku River case, the SCC held unanimously that the Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation (TRTFN), an Indian Act band, “have prima facie Aboriginal 
rights and title over at least some of the area that they claim,”125 and consequently 
the province owed them a duty to consult in relation to construction of a road 
through their traditional territory. Te Court noted that the province clearly had 
notice of the claims of the TRTFN, as they had been attempting to negotiate 
their land claim with Canada since 1983 and with British Columbia after the 
British Columbia Treaty Commission was established in 1993.126 While it 
is not clear from the judgment that the TRTFN had received authority from 
the members of the TRTFN to negotiate the land claim and challenge the 
construction of the road, this was likely assumed, especially as the style of cause 
indicates that the action was brought by the “Taku River Tlingit First Nation 
and Melvin Jack, on behalf of himself and all other members of the Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation.”127 
Comparing Haida Nation and Taku River, we see that in the former case the 
duty to consult was owed to the Haida people as a whole, not to their governing 
bodies, which include two Indian Act band councils, whereas in Taku River the 
duty was owed to the TRTFN, an Indian Act band. In neither case does the 
123. Te Constitution of the Haida Nation provides for governmental authority to be distributed 
among the Council of the Haida Nation, the Hereditary Chiefs Council, and two village 
councils, Old Massett Village Council and Skidegate Band Council. See Constitution of the 
Haida Nation, supra note 122. Te village councils are Indian Act band councils. See “First 
Nation Profles Interactive Map,” online: Government of Canada <geo.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/ 
cippn-fnpim/index-eng.html>. 
124. On Indigenous governance, see the sources in supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
125. Taku River, supra note 117 at para 30. 
126. Ibid at para 26. 
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identity of the claimants to Aboriginal rights and title seem to have been an 
issue. Instead, the SCC appears to have simply assumed that the claimants had 
the authority that they asserted by bringing the proceeding.128 It would therefore 
seem that, unless someone challenges the authority of the Aboriginal people or 
polity claiming to be owed a duty to consult, judges usually will not raise the 
issue themselves by questioning that authority.129 
128. See e.g. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v British Columbia (Utilities Commission), 2009 
BCCA 67, rev’d Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 [Rio 
Tinto]. In Rio Tinto, the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (CSTC) alleged that its member 
tribes have Aboriginal rights and title in the Nechako River watershed in British Columbia, 
giving rise to a duty to consult in relation to sale of electricity from a hydroelectric facility 
built on the river in the 1950s. While the Supreme Court held that there was no duty to 
consult in relation to the sale of electricity because it would not have a new adverse impact 
on the claimed rights, it did not question the authority of the CSTC to bring the action. 
See also Chippewas of the Tames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2015 FCA 222, 
af’d 2017 SCC 41. 
129. See e.g. Pimicikamak v Manitoba, 2016 MBQB 128 [Pimicikamak], af’d 2018 MBCA 49, 
leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38221 (10 January 2019). In Pimicikamak, the applicants 
for judicial review in a duty to consult case were the Cross Lake Band (an Indian Act band) 
and Pimicikamak, the traditional government of the same First Nation community. As the 
community accepted their authority to engage in consultation and Manitoba consulted 
with both of them, the trial judge did not question their standing. Compare the cases 
cited in supra note 118. See also Clyde River, supra note 3. Tis challenge to standing of 
the Nammautaq Hunters & Trappers Organization-Clyde River to represent the collective 
rights-holding body under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement in a duty to consult case 
was dealt with by the Federal Court of Appeal by granting that organization public interest 
standing (the SCC, while reversing the Federal Court of Appeal on whether the duty to 
consult had been met, must have accepted that court’s ruling on the standing issue because it 
proceeded to decide the case without referring to the matter). See also Halalt First Nation v 
British Columbia (Minister of Environment), 2012 BCCA 191 [Halalt First Nation]. Tough 
not a case where such a challenge was made, Halalt First Nation, involving applications for 
intervener status in a duty to consult case, reveals another situation in which this issue could 
arise. Te Cowichan Tribes, who are members of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG) to 
which the Halalt First Nation (the plaintif in the case) also belongs, argued that 
the strength-of-claim assessment required by the duty to consult must include consideration 
of which present-day aboriginal community is likely the proper rights holder. It says if that 
issue had been considered in this case, the Province would not have erred in concluding that 
the Halalt’s aboriginal title claim to the well sites was weak. It submits that the Province should 
have recognised that the HTG member communities as a group are the likely proper rights 
holders of a strong claim to aboriginal title (ibid at para 25). 
Justice Smith denied intervener status to the Cowichan Tribes without discussion of the issue 
of the proper rights holder, as “[t]his issue is being proposed for the frst time on appeal and, 
in any event, could be advanced by Halalt if it so wishes” (ibid at para 30). 












While not attempting a comprehensive survey, it is worth examining a 
couple of lower court decisions where the issue of the identity of the Aboriginal 
title or rights claimants did arise.130 Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council v 
British Columbia (Project Assessment Ofcer, Environmental Assessment Ofce)131 
involved the duty to consult in relation to a proposal to extend a landfll site 
that could have an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights and title. As the landfll 
site was on or close to the boundary between the traditional territories of two 
Aboriginal nations (the Secwepemc or Shuswap Nation and the Nlaka’pamux or 
Tompson River Nation), and the plaintif Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council 
(NNTC) represented some but not all of the Indian Act bands belonging to the 
Nlaka’pamux Nation, a question arose as to whether a duty to consult was owed 
to the NNTC. On this application for judicial review, Justice Sewell said this:132 
What is the government to do when faced with a diversity of putative representation 
on behalf of a First Nation. In my view, the government must discharge its duty to 
consult by taking reasonable steps to ensure that all points of view within a First 
Nation are given appropriate consideration. 
While making a preliminary assessment that the Nlaka’pamux Nation’s 
Aboriginal title claim at the location of the proposed landfll extension was 
weak, Justice Sewell nonetheless decided that a duty to consult was owed 
to the NNTC, even though one of the bands within the NNTC opposed its 
position on the extension of the landfll site and challenged its authority to 
represent the Nlaka’pamux people in this matter.133 Justice Sewell avoided the 
130. For other case references and useful discussion, see Kerry Wilkins, Essentials of Canadian 
Aboriginal Law (Tomson Reuters, 2018), updated in CED (Ont 4th), vol 1, title 1 at 
§ 183-89; Dwight G Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Purich, 
2014) at 65-71. 
131. 2009 BCSC 1275 [Nlaka’pamux Nation BCSC]. 
132. Ibid at para 73. 
133. Tis aspect of his decision was upheld on appeal. See Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council v 
British Columbia (Environmental Assessment Ofce), 2011 BCCA 78 [Nlaka’pamux Nation 
BCCA]. On the practical difculties facing the Crown in this kind of situation, Justice 
Groberman, delivering the judgment, observed: “Like the chambers judge, I have some 
sympathy for the Project Assessment Director in this case. Faced with competing claims and 
obvious animosity among the First Nations groups that were demanding consultation, the 
task of creating an efcient and meaningful consultative process was a daunting one” (ibid
at para 68). For a discussion of Justice Groberman’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, 
see also the text accompanying notes 48-53. For another example, see Ktunaxa Nation v 
British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2014 BCSC 
568, af’d 2015 BCCA 352, af’d Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and 
Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54. Here, the fact that the Shuswap Nation also 
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internal disagreement by deciding that a duty to consult was also owed to the 
dissenting band.134 
In Campbell v British Columbia (Minister of Forests and Range),135 the 
petitioners sought an interim injunction to stop logging pending judicial review 
of a licence issued by the province to Sunshine Logging Ltd, permitting it to 
harvest timber from four cut blocks on Perry Ridge between the Slocan and 
Little Slocan rivers in southern British Columbia, in an area entirely within the 
territory over which the Sinixt people claim Aboriginal title. Te petitioners, 
who are directors of the Sinixt Nation Society, a representative body of the Sinixt 
Nation, brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of the Sinixt 
Nation and the Sinixt Nation Society.136 Te judgment relates to an application 
by the defendant Minister for an order dismissing the petition on the ground that 
“the petitioners are without authority to advance the claims or obtain the relief 
sought, and that they lack the requisite standing to bring the petition.”137 Justice 
Willcock noted that “[t]his is as much a challenge to the claim of the collective 
on behalf of whom the petitioners purport to act as a challenge to the capacity or 
ftness of the individual petitioners to act for that collective.”138 He observed that 
“[i]t is common ground that the rights asserted by the petitioners are collective 
rights and that legal action brought to determine or enforce those rights must 
be brought on behalf of a group that is capable of advancing a claim under s. 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”139 
Te Aboriginal title claim of the Sinixt people, upon which the alleged 
breach of the duty to consult depended in this case, is uncommon among claims 
by First Nations in Canada, in that these people do not currently have federally 
accommodation ofered by the proponent did not prevent the courts from assessing whether 
a duty to consult the Ktunaxa Nation had been met. Compare Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation 
of Alberta, Local 125 v Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Relations), 2016 ABQB 713. Tis is 
a Métis case dealing with the issue of the authority of an applicant for judicial review to 
represent the community claiming Aboriginal rights. 
134. Similarly, “where the Crown knows, or ought to know, that its conduct may adversely 
afect the Indigenous right or title of more than one First Nation, each First Nation is 
entitled to consultation based upon the unique facts and circumstances pertinent to it.” 
See Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153 at para 506, citing 
Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at para 236, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 
37201 (9 February 2017). 
135. 2011 BCSC 448 [Campbell BCSC]. 
136. Ibid, style of cause. 
137. Ibid at para 7. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid at para 9. See also Hwlitsum First Nation, supra note 107 at para 6. 









acknowledged status as an Indian Act band or bands. Tere was, however, 
no doubt about their existence as an Aboriginal people prior to the arrival of 
Europeans. Justice Willcock observed:140 
Te evidence before me is that a relatively distinct Aboriginal population made use 
of and occupied land between the Monashee and Selkirk Mountains, from the Kettle 
River north to the area of present-day Revelstoke, for a period of approximately 
3,500 years, up to the time of contact with European explorers and settlers. Te 
record also establishes that following contact, the Sinixt’s numbers in Canada were 
reduced by disease and their gradual displacement south into the United States. 
Tragically, the Sinixt never recovered from the decimation caused by a 
smallpox epidemic in the late 1700s. By the early twentieth century, most of their 
members had gone to live in the United States, particularly on the Colville Indian 
Reservation that had been created in 1872 in what became Washington State. 
Although a reserve at Oatscott in British Columbia was created for the Arrow 
Lakes Band of Sinixt by the Canadian government in 1915, by 1924 apparently 
only eight members of this band remained. After the last registered member, 
Annie Joseph, died on 1 October 1953, the federal government declared the 
Arrow Lakes Band to be extinct and transferred the reserve lands at Oatscott to 
British Columbia.141 Justice Willcock noted:142 
Te Arrow Lakes Band appears to have been the only Indian band in British 
Columbia history to have been declared extinct by Canada and have its reserve 
land revert to the province. However, Sinixt individuals were and are living among 
and as members of the Osoyoos, Penticton, and Okanagan Bands of the Okanagan 
Nation Alliance, in Washington State as members of the Lakes Tribe of the Colville 
Confederacy, and of reservation in Canada and the United States. 
Te problem for the petitioners was proving the existence of a present-day 
identifable claimant group that they represent. Unfortunately, the evidence 
regarding the continuing existence of a distinct Sinixt people was inconsistent. 
Tere were also “competing claims to speak for the contemporary manifestation 
of the historic rights-bearing group.”143 Te Sinixt Nation Society, to which the 
petitioners belong, was incorporated in 2006 to provide education about the 
history, culture, and traditions of the Sinixt people in British Columbia and to 
promote their interests. Counsel for the petitioners nonetheless “acknowledged 
that the Society cannot claim or enforce an Aboriginal right or title and is not 
140. Campbell BCSC, supra note 135 at para 15. 
141. Ibid at para 34. 
142. Ibid at para 42. 
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entitled to an injunction. Evidence of the existence of the Society and its role is 
put before the court solely as evidence of the composition of the Sinixt Nation 
and recognition of the individual named petitioners as representatives of that 
organization or collective.”144 But the evidence did not disclose clear criteria for 
membership in the Society or reveal how individuals become members, nor was 
its authority to represent the Sinixt as a whole accepted by all interested parties, 
matters that obviously bothered Justice Willcock. He decided that, in order to 
have standing to bring a representative action, the petitioners had to “clearly 
defne a distinct Aboriginal collective by objective criteria, so that their claim that a 
collective with rights-bearing attributes exists and their claim to be the appropriate 
representatives of that collective can be adjudicated upon.”145 He found that they 
had failed to do so, and as a result he dismissed their petition because it had not 
been properly brought as a representative action. Tis decision was plainly based 
on lack of adequate evidence, as Justice Willcock said he would have reserved 
judgment pending a hearing of an application to produce additional evidence, “if 
an application had been brought and if there was a prospect that further evidence 
could address the defciencies in the representative case.”146 An application to 
appeal this decision was dismissed by the BCCA as moot because the logging the 
petitioners were trying to prevent had already been completed by the time the 
appeal reached that court!147 
Te Campbell case reveals that, in situations where the present-day existence 
of an Aboriginal collective that holds or claims Aboriginal rights or title is in 
doubt, the onus is on the Aboriginal claimants to prove both its existence and 
its connection with the historical community from whom the rights or title are 
144. Ibid at para 61. 
145. Ibid at para 163. See also Hwlitsum First Nation, supra note 107 at para 9. 
146. Campbell, supra note 135 at para 165. Note that Justice Willcock’s judgment contains a 
lengthy, careful analysis of the law in relation to representative actions involving Aboriginal 
claims that could assist future litigants in avoiding some of the potential pitfalls in bringing 
these kinds of actions. 
147. Campbell v British Columbia (Minister of Forests and Range), 2012 BCCA 274. 














derived.148 If the representative capacity of the plaintifs in an Aboriginal title, 
rights, or duty to consult case is challenged, as it was by the Minister in Campbell, 
the decision also suggests that the plaintifs might have to prove that they have 
the authority to bring the action on behalf of the present-day collective that 
holds or claims the title or rights.149 However, in our examination of Nlaka’pamux 
Nation we saw that Justice Sewell took a more generous approach where the duty 
to consult is concerned, ruling that “the government must discharge its duty 
to consult by taking reasonable steps to ensure that all points of view within 
a First Nation are given appropriate consideration,”150 and this aspect of his 
decision was upheld by the BCCA.151 Signifcantly, Justice Willcock cited the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Nlaka’pamux Nation,152 without remarking any 
discrepancy between the fexible approach to representative capacity in that case 
and his own approach. 
More recently, the issue of whether the Sinixt people have an Aboriginal right 
to hunt in their traditional territory in the Kootenay region of British Columbia 
148. Te evidentiary onus here appears to be similar to the onus where Métis Aboriginal rights 
are claimed. See Powley, supra note 36 at para 28. In Powley, the SCC accepted that the 
trial judge’s fnding of a contemporary rights-bearing Métis community was “supported by 
the evidence and must be upheld.” See Campbell BCSC, supra note 135 at paras 114-20. 
In Campbell BCSC, Justice Willcock quoted Powley on the issue of membership in the 
contemporary community and concluded: 
Tese passages suggest that it is not enough that a contemporary community acknowledge 
an individual’s membership in the community in order to establish that individual’s status. 
Te contemporary community itself must be able to establish its continuity with the historic 
rights-bearing community. Recognition of an individual’s status by a newly-formed community 
is not sufcient to confer status upon that individual to claim s.35 rights [emphasis added] 
(ibid at para 120). 
See also Marshall/Bernard, supra note 7 at para 67; Labrador Métis Nation v Newfoundland 
and Labrador (Minister of Transportation and Works), 2007 NLCA 75 at paras 46-49; Bernard 
v R, 2017 NBCA 48. 
149. See also PF Résolu Canada inc c Wawatie, 2014 QCCS 3972, leave to appeal to QCCA 
refused, 2014 QCCA 1840; Manatch v Louisiana-Pacifc Canada Ltd, 2014 QCCS 4350 
at paras 52-74. Compare Beaver ONCA, supra note 110, especially at para 60. In Beaver, 
the Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed the motion judge on the issue of standing, in part 
because the appellant was acting in his individual capacity and did not claim to represent the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy. 
150. Nlaka’pamux Nation BCSC, supra note 131 at para 73. 
151. Nlaka’pamux Nation BCCA, supra note 133. 
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was addressed in R v DeSautel.153 Richard Desautel, an American citizen and a 
member of the Lakes Tribe of the Colville Confederated Tribes (CCT), resides in 
Washington State on the Colville Indian Reservation. He lawfully entered Canada 
and was hunting to obtain ceremonial meat on the instructions of the CCT’s Fish 
and Wildlife Director. He shot an elk near Castlegar and was charged under the 
British Columbia Wildlife Act154 with hunting without a licence and hunting 
big game without being a resident of the province. While not a duty-to-consult 
case, this decision is relevant to our current discussion because it revisited the 
issue of whether the Sinixt people can claim section 35(1) Aboriginal rights. 
At trial, Provincial Court Judge Mrozinski held that the Sinixt had hunted in the 
Kootenay region prior to contact (which occurred in 1811 when David Tomson 
visited the region), that hunting was integral to their distinctive culture and so 
supported the asserted Aboriginal right to hunt for food, social, and ceremonial 
purposes, and that this right had not been extinguished. Te Crown argued 
nonetheless that the Sinixt could not have Aboriginal rights in Canada because 
by 1900 most of them had moved to the southern part of their territory in 
Washington State and no longer hunted north of the border after 1930, and they 
ceased to exist as a rights-holding collective in Canada at the time of the death in 
the 1950s of Annie Joseph, the last surviving member of the Arrow Lakes Band. 
Justice Mrozinski found that, while a modern-day Sinixt community (now called 
the Lakes Tribe) does exist in Washington State, the question to be answered 
was whether they could have Aboriginal rights in their traditional territory in 
British Columbia, given that they had ceased to reside or hunt there for many 
years. She decided that there was sufcient continuity between the practice of 
hunting in pre-contact times and the present and that the right to hunt in their 
traditional territory in Canada continued even though it probably had not been 
exercised from the 1930s until recent times. As she found that the provisions of 
the Wildlife Act infringed Mr. Desautel’s right to hunt and the Crown was unable 
to justify the infringement, she decided he should be acquitted.155 
On appeal to the British Columbia Supreme Court, the Crown argued 
that Mr. Desautel cannot be an Aboriginal person of Canada with section 35(1) 
153. 2017 BCPC 84 [DeSautel BCPC]. Note that apparently the defendant’s name is “Desautel,” 
though in some case reports it is spelled “DeSautel”. 
154. RSBC 1996, c 488. 
155. Justice Mrozinski also dismissed the Crown’s contention that it would be incompatible 
with Crown sovereignty for an American citizen resident in the United States to have an 
Aboriginal right to hunt in Canada. See DeSautel BCPC, supra note 153 at paras 136-67. 













rights156 because he is an American citizen and a member of an Indigenous group 
that is not resident in this country.157 In rejecting this argument, Justice Sewell 
stated that “the Crown’s approach imposes non-aboriginal concepts such as 
citizenship and permanent residence on the proper interpretation of the degree 
of connection between an aboriginal group and Canada necessary for them to be 
considered aboriginal peoples of Canada.”158 He concluded that the fact that the 
Sinixt community to which Mr. Desautel belongs is now resident in the United 
States does not preclude them from being an Aboriginal people of Canada, given 
their long-term connection with their traditional territory in this country. Adding 
support to this conclusion, he found that159 
recognizing that the Sinixt are aboriginal people of Canada under s. 35 is entirely 
consistent with the objective of reconciliation established in the jurisprudence. In 
my view, it would be inconsistent with that objective to deny a right to a group that 
occupied the land in question in pre-contact times and continued to actively use the 
territory for some years after the imposition of the international boundary on them. 
Justice Sewell accordingly upheld the acquittal. 
Te Crown appealed to the BCCA. Justice Smith, in her unanimous decision, 
accepted the factual fndings of the trail judge that the Sinixt people were the 
historical collective that had hunted in the geographical area in question, that 
hunting was a central and signifcant part of their distinctive culture prior to 
contact, that the Lakes Tribe of which Mr. Desautel is a member is a modern 
Indigenous collective (though possibly not the only one) with rights originating 
from the Sinixt people, and that there was sufcient continuity between the 
Sinixt’s pre-contact hunting and Lakes Tribe’s present-day hunting. In response 
to the Crown’s argument, Justice Smith said:160 
Imposing a requirement that Indigenous peoples may only hold Aboriginal rights in 
Canada if they occupy the same geographical area in which their ancestors exercised 
156. Te rights recognized and afrmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, are the 
rights of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada.” See s 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
157. R v Desautel, 2017 BCSC 2389 at para 7 [Desautel BCSC]. 
158. Ibid at para 53. Justice Sewell also rejected the Crown’s argument that acknowledging that 
the Sinixt people residing in the United States have an Aboriginal right to hunt in British 
Columbia would be incompatible with Canadian sovereignty. See ibid at paras 92-123. 
159. Ibid at para 88. Imposition of the boundary along the 49th parallel occurred in 1846 
when Britain and the United States signed the Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty. See 
ibid at para 18. 
160. R v Desautel, 2019 BCCA 151 at para 62, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38734 
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those rights, ignores the Aboriginal perspective, the realities of colonization and 
does little towards achieving the ultimate goal of reconciliation. In this case, such a 
requirement would extinguish Mr. Desautel’s right to hunt in the traditional territory 
of his ancestors even though the rights of his community in that geographical area 
were never voluntarily surrendered, abandoned or extinguished. 
She also dismissed the argument that it would be incompatible with 
Canadian sovereignty for an Indigenous person who is not a citizen or resident of 
Canada to have an Aboriginal right to hunt in this country because such a right 
can exist without an incidental right to enter Canada. Mr. Desautel had entered 
Canada legally and did not claim a right of entry. Te Supreme Court of Canada 
has granted leave to appeal this decision. 
On the issue of the rights-holding community, the petitioners in Campbell
were unsuccessful mainly because they did not provide the court with sufcient 
evidence of the claimants’ present-day existence as a collective having continuity 
with the pre-contact Sinixt people. Te diference in Desautel is that the accused 
is a member of a defned Indigenous community, albeit resident in the United 
States, that has a clear connection with that pre-contact people. Both cases afrm 
that Aboriginal title and rights depend on proof of a present-day Indigenous 
collective that has a sufcient connection with an Indigenous people whose 
occupation of land or whose practices, customs, and traditions are the basis for 
the title or other rights. 
Summarizing our discussion of the relevant duty-to-consult cases, 
we know from the Supreme Court’s decision in Behn that the duty is owed to 
the collective that holds or asserts the rights or title.161 It is therefore necessary 
to defne the present-day collective, as was held in Campbell162—though how 
precisely remains to be seen—and show its connection with the pre-contact or 
pre-sovereignty collective from whom the claimed rights or title are derived.163 
Also, the organization or individuals who claim to represent the rights or title 
holding collective must have the authority to act in that capacity.164 In instances 
where a subgroup within the collective is the custodian or caretaker of the rights 
or title in question, that subgroup may be able to engage in consultation on 
161. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
163. Te SCC views this as a continuity requirement. See Marshall/Bernard, supra note 7 at 
para 67. Te Court stated: “Te requirement of continuity in its most basic sense simply 
means that claimants must establish they are right holders. Modern-day claimants must 
establish a connection with the pre-sovereignty group upon whose practices they rely to assert 
title or claim to a more restricted aboriginal right” (ibid at para 67). 
164. Behn, supra note 118 and accompanying text. 











behalf of the collective, as Justice Groberman suggested in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation.165 Te cases we have examined also reveal that, 
if unquestioned, the requisite authority is usually assumed from the circumstances, 
but when challenged, it has to be established by evidence.166 But the Nlaka’pamux 
Nation decision suggests that, where there are divisions among the rights or title 
claimants, the duty to consult may be owed to more than one organization 
representing diferent interests within the collective.167 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: FROM TITLE AND RIGHTS TO 
GOVERNANCE 
Our examination of the relevant case law has revealed that Aboriginal rights and 
title are communal rights vested in present-day collectives that are connected 
by descent or succession to the Indigenous people whose practices, customs, 
and traditions are the source of specifc Aboriginal rights, or who were in 
exclusive occupation of land giving rise to title at the time of Crown assertion 
of sovereignty. While the specifc rights cases discussed in Part II do shed some 
light on the issue of the identity of rights holders, the fact that most of those 
cases involved prosecution of individuals has meant that precise identifcation 
of the rights-holding collective was usually unnecessary. Te Aboriginal title 
cases discussed in Part I, while less numerous, are nonetheless more illuminating 
because, apart from Marshall/Bernard, they involved civil actions for declarations 
of title on behalf of Aboriginal collectives. Te duty to consult cases discussed in 
Part III are also germane to this discussion, but we have seen that this duty, while 
owed to rights and title holders or claimants, can be fulflled by consultation with 
organizations or individuals that have been authorized by rights or title holders 
or claimants to represent them. In cases where this authority is not questioned, 
the precise identity of the proper rights or title holders, or claimants, is not 
always apparent. 
Our analysis of the trial and BCCA decisions in Tsilhqot’in Nation revealed 
that the judges engaged directly with the issue of the identity of rights and title 
165. See Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at paras 152, 156. 
166. For more discussion, see Campbell BCSC, supra note 135 at paras 56, 61, 134, 163; 
Campbell BCCA, supra note 70. 
167. See text accompanying notes 132-34. Nlaka’pamux Nation also suggests that, in the case of 
overlapping claims, a duty to consult may be owed to more than one collective. In some 
instances, claims of this sort may involve joint Aboriginal title, where the duty to consult 
would be owed to each collective claiming joint title. On joint title, see McNeil, “Joint 
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holders, and decided that the current holder of Aboriginal rights and title is the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole, not Indian Act bands. Tis conclusion, which does 
not appear to have been challenged by any of the parties on appeal to the SCC, 
was implicitly afrmed by that Court’s declaration of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s 
Aboriginal title. However, I do not understand this to mean that rights and title 
will be vested in Aboriginal nations in every instance; instead, it depends on the 
evidence. At trial in Tsilhqot’in Nation, Justice Vickers stated that the inquiry 
into the identity of the rights and title holders “is primarily a matter of fact to 
be determined on the whole of the evidence relating to the specifc society or 
culture.”168 He found that the “Tsilhqot’in people were the historic community of 
people sharing language, customs, traditions, historical experience, territory and 
resources at the time of frst contact and at sovereignty assertion.”169 Any rights of 
individuals or subgroups were derived from the collective actions, traditions, and 
experience of the Tsilhqot’in Nation.170 As for the holders of present-day rights 
and title, Justice Vickers found as a fact that171 
Tsilhqot’in people make no distinction amongst themselves at the band level as 
to their individual right to harvest resources. Te evidence is that, as between 
Tsilhqot’in people, any person in the group can hunt or fsh anywhere inside 
Tsilhqot’in territory. Te right to harvest resides in the collective Tsilhqot’in 
community. Individual community members identify as Tsilhqot’in people frst, 
rather than as band members. 
So although one Indian Act band, the Xeni Gwet’in, is currently the caretaker 
or custodian of the Claim Area where Aboriginal rights and title were declared, 
it is not the rights and title holder. Rights and title are vested in the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation as a whole.172 
Although an Aboriginal rights rather than a title case (title was claimed 
but not dealt with), it is worth comparing the decision of Justice Garson in 
Ahousaht Indian Band with Tsilhqot’in Nation. In the former case, Justice Garson 
decided that the current holders of the Aboriginal right to fsh commercially 
are the fve Indian Act bands that are the successor collectives of the fve 
168. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 439. 
169. Ibid at para 470. 
170. Ibid. 
171. Ibid at para 459. 
172. See also ibid at para 468. Justice Vickers stated: 
In the modern Tsilhqot’in political structure, Xeni Gwet’in people are viewed amongst 
Tsilhqot’in people as the caretakers of the lands in and about Xeni, including Tachelach’ed. 
Other bands are considered to be the caretakers of the lands that surround their reserves. Still, 
the caretakers have no more rights to the land or the resources than any other Tsilhqot’in person. 










Nuu-chah-nulth Nations whose practices, customs, and traditions gave rise to 
the right.173 In reaching this conclusion, she accepted the plaintifs’ contention 
that, “[a]fter British Columbia’s entry into Confederation in 1871, each of the 
Nuu-chah-nulth Nations was constituted as a band under the predecessor of the 
Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5, and, today, each band is the legal representative of 
its predecessor Nation and the lawful holder of the collective aboriginal rights 
and title of that Nation.”174 Her decision that Indian Act bands are the current 
holders of the fshing right was therefore based on the evidence, as was Justice 
Vickers’ decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation that the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole is 
the holder of Aboriginal rights and title. 
Evidence of the identity of the appropriate current holders or claimants 
of Aboriginal rights and title evidently must come from the Indigenous people 
concerned. As Justice Groberman stated in his Court of Appeal judgment in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, expressing agreement with Justice Vickers, “the defnition of 
the proper rights holder is a matter to be determined primarily from the viewpoint 
of the Aboriginal collective itself.”175 Tat viewpoint needs to be demonstrated 
by evidence. Given that determination of the question of who has rights is at 
least partly a matter of law,176 this suggests that Indigenous law is relevant to 
answer this question. But because Canadian judges are generally unfamiliar with 
Indigenous law and cannot access it through conventional legal research, it has to 
be presented to them mainly through testimony by Indigenous people who are 
acknowledged in their communities as the authorities on that law. 
Once the collective holder of Aboriginal rights or title has been identifed, 
one needs to consider who can exercise those rights or enjoy the benefts of that 
title, and on what terms.177 Te kinds of rights involved, whether rights to hunt, 
173. See text accompanying notes 99-105. 
174. Ahousaht Indian Band BCSC, supra note 72 at para 7. 
175. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at para 149. 
176. See R v DeSautel, 2018 BCCA 131. 
177. See Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights,” supra note 30 at 745. Slattery stated: 
the rights of individuals and other entities within the group are determined inter se, not by the 
doctrine of aboriginal title, but by internal rules founded on custom. Tese rules dictate the 
extent to which any individual, family, lineage, or other sub-group has rights to possess and use 
lands and resources vested in the entire group. Te rules have a customary base, but they are 
not for that reason necessarily static. Except to the extent they may be otherwise regulated by 
statute, they are open to both formal and informal change, in accordance with shifting group 
attitudes, needs, and practices. 
Tis passage was quoted with apparent approval by Justice Vickers at trial in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation BCSC and Justice Groberman in Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA. See Tsilhqot’in Nation 
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fsh, occupy and use land, and so on, generally cannot be enjoyed and exercised 
by a collective as such; instead, they are enjoyed and exercised by individuals, 
families, and other small groups. Given that the collective is necessarily made up 
of individual members, it is essential to be able to determine who the members 
are. As Justice Vickers observed in Tsilhqot’in Nation, this is an internal matter 
to be decided by the collective: “Membership is identifed by the community. 
It should always be the particular Aboriginal community that determines its 
own membership.”178 
In my opinion, all this leads inevitably to the conclusion that the rights 
or title holding collective must have governmental authority.179 Governmental 
structures and powers are obviously necessary for a community to make collective 
decisions about how its communal rights are to be allocated and managed.180 
Determinations about membership in the community also involve the exercise 
of governmental authority. Tis matter of governance was put before the SCC in 
Delgamuukw, but the Court declined to consider it, sending the matter back to 
trial along with the issue of the existence of Aboriginal title.181 But now, with the 
declaration of collective Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in Nation, the matter can no 
longer be avoided. In the absence of guidance from Canadian courts, Indigenous 
peoples can take the initiative in exercising their governance authority. In the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation judgment, the SCC expanded the authority of the provinces 
over Aboriginal title lands by discarding the application of the doctrine on 
178. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 30 at para 444. 
179. While not deciding issues of Indigenous governance, Justice Vickers appears to have agreed 
with this assessment. See ibid at paras 471-72. Justice Vickers quoted with approval from 
two articles (which are cited in note 30) where Brian Slattery distinguished between the 
external and internal aspects of Aboriginal title. Internally, Slattery wrote in 1987, “the rights 
of group members among themselves … are governed by rules peculiar to the group, as laid 
down by custom or internal governmental organs.” See Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal 
Rights,” supra note 30 at 745 [emphasis added]. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
Justice Groberman quoted the same passage, again with apparent approval. See Tsilhqot’in 
Nation BCCA, supra note 30 at para 149. See also John Borrows, “Te Durability of Terra 
Nullius; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 701 at 717-20 
[Borrows, “Terra Nullius”]. 
180. See Campbell v BC, supra note 33 at para 137. Justice Williamson stated: 
Te right to Aboriginal title “in its full form”, including the right for the community to make 
decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the right to have a political structure for 
making those decisions, is, I conclude, constitutionally guaranteed by Section 35 [of the 
Constitution Act, 1982] (ibid at para 137). 
See also the other sources cited in supra note 33. 
181. Delgamuukw SCC, supra note 6 at paras 170-71. 










interjurisdictional immunity in this context.182 One reason the Court gave for 
doing so was to avoid a legal vacuum.183 But given that Indigenous peoples have 
their own laws in relation to their title lands and the exercise of other Aboriginal 
rights, there is no legal vacuum.184 By exercising their governmental authority 
and ensuring that their laws are respected, Indigenous peoples can “pro-actively 
use and manage” their title lands, as the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation said 
they have a right to do.185 
182. Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8 at paras 131-52. For critical commentary, see McNeil, 
“Aboriginal Title and the Provinces,” supra note 29; Kerry Wilkins, “Life among the Ruins: 
Section 91(24) after Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows” (2017) 55 Alta L Rev 91. 
183. Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8 at para 147. 
184. See Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law,” supra note 2, especially at 894-95; Christie, supra note 65; 
Borrows, “Terra Nullius,” supra note 179 at 738-40. 
185. Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 8 at para 73. 
